Managing the Nazi Legacy: Contradictory Reconstruction Policies in US-Occupied Germany, 1945-1952 by Speyer Besancon, Rachel
Wellesley College
Wellesley College Digital Scholarship and Archive
Honors Thesis Collection
2019
Managing the Nazi Legacy: Contradictory




Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.wellesley.edu/thesiscollection
This Dissertation/Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by Wellesley College Digital Scholarship and Archive. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Honors Thesis Collection by an authorized administrator of Wellesley College Digital Scholarship and Archive. For more information,
please contact ir@wellesley.edu.
Recommended Citation
Speyer Besancon, Rachel, "Managing the Nazi Legacy: Contradictory Reconstruction Policies in US-Occupied Germany, 1945-1952"
















Managing the Nazi Legacy: 
Contradictory Reconstruction Policies in 
















Submitted in Partial Fulfillment 
of the 
Prerequisite for Honors 
in Political Science 














It has been a long nine months of research and writing, and this thesis would not exist if it were 
not for the love and support of countless people in my life.  I would like to take a moment to 
mention just a few of these many people who have helped me throughout this past year. 
 
There are not words to describe how much I admire, respect, and value Professor Stacie 
Goddard, but I’ll try anyway.  Her guidance and encouraging words have been invaluable to me 
throughout this process, and I cannot imagine writing this thesis without her beside me each step 
of the way.  Beyond being incredible for spending countless hours reading and editing my work, 
offering feedback and driving me to push my argument further, Professor Goddard took a chance 
on me when I emailed her asking to be my advisor, having never met her before.  Our first 
meeting was over Skype, as I tried to explain my plans for the thesis from a rooftop in Rome 
during my Spring break.  Despite the bizarre circumstances of our first meeting, Professor 
Goddard was supportive from the start, always ready to remind me what my argument was when 
I had managed to lose it in mountains of books and documents.  This thesis would not have been 
written if it were not for her and I am eternally grateful. 
 
I am also grateful to my additional thesis committee members, Professor Paul MacDonald, 
Professor Bill Joseph, and Professor Wes Watters for agreeing to serve on my committee and 
reading this mammoth of a thesis.  My first class in IR was with Professor MacDonald my 
sophomore year and after one semester with him I decided IR would be my concentration within 
the department.  Thank you, Professor MacDonald, for first introducing me to constructivism and 
preparing me so well for an extensive course load in IR.   
 
Professor Joseph has been incredibly accommodating for me in the department, helping me make 
sure I could fulfill the major requirements while completing this thesis and spending a year 
studying away.  Thank you, Professor Joseph for your flexibility and understanding. 
 
Thank you to Professor Wes Watters for being a wonderful minor advisor in Astronomy and 
professor these past four years.  I would not have been an Astronomy minor if it were not for you 
and I would not have been anywhere near as comfortable saying “I don’t know” if it weren’t for 
your classes.  The Astronomy department has been a very important part of my experience at 
Wellesley and I am forever grateful to you for welcoming me into it my first week at Wellesley. 
 
A hearty thank you to Professor Candland and Professor Grattan for mentoring us seniors 
pursuing honors in political science over many a delicious lunch meeting.  Your kind words of 
affirmation and encouragement were most welcome throughout this process and I look forward 
to celebrating with you. 
 
 ii 
I am also thankful to Professor Quinn Slobodian in the history department and his Spring 2016 
“Postwar Europe and the Three Germanies” class for first introducing me to this topic.  I never 
would have guessed that it would take me three years before I found an answer to my first 
question in that class, but I am glad to have found it, even if I now have thought of even more 
things to consider in regard to German reconstruction.  Thank you, Professor Slobodian. 
 
The biggest unsung heroes in thesis research are always the incredible librarians working behind 
the scenes to help locate the bizarre works I request.  Thank you to the wonderful people 
working in Clapp and Interlibrary Loan.  A special thank you to Clapp staff and Wellesley alums 
Karen Storz and Sarah Moazeni for helping me locate those missing issues of Reader’s Digest 
and offering guidance on all things library related (thesis-related and otherwise). 
 
I would like to thank the Jerome A. Schiff Fellowship for their generous offer of funds to help 
me conduct archival research for this project.  A no thank you to the federal government for 
shutting down the month I was meant to visit the Truman Presidential Library in Independence, 
Missouri, but I am grateful to the Schiff Fellowship all the same. 
 
Between landing in Missouri excited to do my research and realizing I needed to fly back 
because the library was closed, I met one of the warmest and kindest women in the world: 
Jacquie, my AirBnB host.  Thank you, Jacquie, for being so incredibly understanding amidst the 
chaos of the government shutdown.  You made six hours in Missouri great, welcoming me into 
your home, giving me a tour of the town, providing me with a delicious Italian dinner and 
wonderful conversation, and a ride back to the airport.  The world would be better if there were 
more people like you in it. 
 
To Dr. Giovanni Cadioli, Dr. Alessandro Iandolo, and Brianna Lifshitz, thank you for making 
my wonderful year in Oxford one spent learning and writing about topics I was so passionate 
about.  To Giovanni and Alessandro, my wonderful tutors, I am thankful for the opportunity to 
delve into twentieth century European history and politics with a vengeance, writing multiple 
essays a week, and bettering my research and writing skills.  What I learned in Oxford has been 
incredibly helpful these past nine months.  To my darling Brianna, thank you for being a 
wonderful tutorial partner and friend as we traipsed around Europe singing the Sound of Music 
and learning new languages.  Oxford would not have been the same without you and your 
incessant talk of the Yankees.  Go Sox! 
 
To Maya Nandakumar and Ananya Hariharan, my incredible thesis cohort: I have had the best 
time getting to know you two this year and I cannot imagine going through this process without 
you.  Thank you for keeping me smiling through the pain of writing a theory chapter.  Maya, I 
still cannot believe we didn’t become friends our first year, but better late than never.  I will 
forever love my thesis sister and fellow dogsitter.  A special thank you to Samwise and Pippin, 
 iii 
Professor Goddard’s wonderful two golden retrievers, is also necessary, for their comforting 
presence during many a stressful meeting and writing session. 
 
To my wonderful friends who have supported me throughout this process and actually listened as 
I explained my breakthroughs in “narrative wave theory” and OMGUS document hunting: thank 
you.  To Kate Bird, Jordanne Stobbs-Vergara, and Lucy Wanzer especially, you three have 
always been so supportive of me, knowing to distract me from my thesis when I needed to be 
and putting up with me when all I would talk about was Germany and baseball. 
 
And lastly, to my wonderful family who have asked for updates on the thesis with a perfect 
balance: not too often to cause me stress, but enough that I felt cared for and supported.  To 
Elizabeth for offering homemade pizza on my late nights spent writing and for unfettered access 
to Austin, thank you.  To Jeffrey (and everyone working at Peet’s Coffee and Tea) for providing 
probably gallons of free tea at this point as I spent hours in that coffee shop writing, thank you.  I 
estimate about 90% of this thesis was written at Peet’s and your hospitality did not go unnoticed.  
To Dad for always happily offering rides to the grocery store and around town whenever I asked 
and for offering a welcome distraction from my work, thank you.  And lastly, to Mom for 
convincing me to write this in the first place.  I’m so glad you encouraged me to do this despite 
me swearing up and down I could never and would never write a thesis in the department.  
Thank you for pushing me and for joining me for late night writing/grading parties in Clapp.  
















“The Germans are more intangible, more ample, more contradictory, more 
unknown, more incalculable, more surprising, and even more terrifying than 
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This thesis seeks to identify the circumstances in the postwar United States that allowed 
American foreign policymakers to pursue contradictory denazification programs in occupied 
Germany.  On May 8, 1945, Germany transformed from a sovereign state to an occupied 
territory.  The United States and its Allies were tasked with administering the agreed upon plans 
for occupation in Germany, predominantly focused on denazification and reconstruction.  In the 
American zone, the Occupying Military Government’s plans for denazification and 
reconstruction affected segments of the population very differently.  While low-ranking public 
officials were banned from public service due to their ties to the Nazi regime, powerful 
industrialists and governmental leaders were gradually welcomed back into positions of 
responsibility with the government.  How did the US government justify its inconsistent 
enforcement of the Nazi purge and what enabled them to pursue these policies?  I argue that the 
unsettled narrative landscape of postwar America made such contradictions tenable in a chaotic 
political climate.  Through a cultural study of American popular media from 1939-1950, I 
identify the three dominant narratives of “the German” in the US during this time and show how 








Abbreviations and English Terms: 
 
ACC (Allied Control Council): the four-power occupation organization tasked with 
managing administrative plans in occupied Germany across all zones 
CDU (Christlich Demokratische Union): “Christian Democratic Union;” the West German 
conservative neoliberal party founded under occupation 
HiCOG (High Commissioner for Occupied Germany): the top-ranking position in Germany 
within the US government; position existed from 1949-1955 
IG Farben: primary chemical producer in Nazi Germany; produced Zyklon B for Third 
Reich; after denazification broken down into BASF, Bayer, Agfa, and Hoechst 
IMT (International Military Tribunal): court through which the Nuremberg Trials were held 
JCS (Joint Chiefs of Staff): group of top-ranked members of military tasked with advising 
the president on matters of national security and occupation; administered directives that 
outlined US’ interests in Germany for occupation 
KPD (Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands): “Communist Party of Germany;” left-wing 
communist party of Germany founded before the Nazis took power and revived after the war 
Krupp Steel: primary steel and arms producer in Nazi Germany; after denazification merged 
with Thyssen to form Thyssenkrupp 
NSDAP (Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei): “National Socialist German 
Worker’s Party;” Nazi Party led by Adolf Hitler 
OMGUS (Occupying Military Government of the United States): term used for the 
occupying US government in West Germany 
SED (Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands): “Socialist Unity Party of Germany;” the 
merged East German party consisting of the KPD and the SPD 
SPD (Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands): “Social Democratic Party of Germany;” 
the left-leaning social-democratic party in West Germany under occupation 
Zyklon B: the gas used to kill Jews in the extermination camps; developed and manufactured 
by IG Farben 
 
German Terms and Phrases: 
 
Anschluss: “connection/joining;” the term for Austria’s joining of the Third Reich 
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Biergarten: “beer garden;” a (usually outdoor) space to drink alcohol and converse 
Der Völkischer Beobachter: “the People’s Observer;” the national Nazi newspaper in 
Germany circulated during the Third Reich 
Deutsche Arbeitsfront: “German Labor Front;” the nationalized sole labor union of Nazi 
Germany 
Deutsches Rotes Kreuz: “German Red Cross;” somewhat controlled by the Nazis during the 
Third Reich, but still limited by the Geneva Convention 
Deutschland den Deutschen: “Germany for Germans;” a slogan of the Nazi Party 
Die Todesmühlen: “The Death Mills;” a 1945 film made by the US Department of War to 
document the genocidal activities that had taken place in the extermination camps 
Die Weiße Rose: “The White Rose;” a peaceful, intellectual anti-Nazi organization run by a 
professor out of the University of Munich 
Dirndl: the traditional Austro-Bavarian dress for women and girls one sees at traditional 
German folk festivals 
Einsatzgruppen: a Nazi paramilitary mobile killing squad under the SS, primarily targeting 
civilians 
Entnazifizierungsschlussgesetz: “end of denazification law;” passed in 1949 by German 
authorities 
Fragebogen: plural Fragebögen; the 131-item questionnaire distributed by occupation 
authorities required for employment in public office or major industries 
Führer: “leader/father;” term used in regard to Hitler 
Geheime Staatspolizei (Gestapo): “Secret State Police;” official police of Third Reich led by 
Hermann Göring 
Gemeinden: “towns;” the smallest municipalities within Germany 
Gleichschaltung: “coordination;” the process of the Nazis establishing totalitarian control in 
Germany by assuming control over all aspects of German society 
Grundgesetz: “Basic Law;” the constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany 
Hitlerjugend: “Hitler Youth;” the national Nazi youth organization used to indoctrinate 
children 
Junkers: the land-owning nobility of Prussia who employed peasants to work their land 
Kreise (Landkreise, Stadtkreise): “counties;” including rural counties and city countries 
Glossary | Speyer Besancon 
viii 
Land: plural Länder; federal states in Germany 
Lebensraum: “living space;” the land (and resources) east of Germany that Hitler believed 
Aryans were entitled to in order to let the master race expand as it was meant to 
Lederhosen: “leather pants;” the traditional German leather shorts for men and boys 
Machtergreifung: “seizure of power;” an alternative term for Hitler’s ascendancy, more 
revolutionary-sounding in nature than Machtübernahme 
Machtübernahme: “takeover of power;” Hitler’s preferred term for his ascendance to the 
Chancellery in Germany 
Meldebogen: plural Meldebögen; the two-page questionnaire distributed by occupation 
authorities required for food ration cards 
Reichskulturkrammer: “Reich’s Chamber of Culture;” the Nazi organization of all creatives 
and artists in Germany; a product of the Gleichschaltung 
Reichstag: “parliament;” German parliament under the Weimar Republic 
Ruhr: the heavily industrialized land in northwest Germany near the border with The 
Netherlands 
Saarland: a small territory in West Germany on the border with France that belonged to both 
countries at different times throughout the century 
Schutzstaffel (SS): “protection squadron;” the primary paramilitary organization under the 
Nazi Party 
Sieg Heil: “victory hail;” a verbal salute of sorts, common in Nazi Germany; a phrase 
shouted in admiration at Nazi Party rallies along with the Hitler salute 
Sportpalast: a large convention hall in Berlin that housed multiple Nazi Party rallies 
Stunde null: “hour zero;” the myth that there was a clear reset between the end of the Third 
Reich and the founding of the Federal Republic of Germany 
Sturmabteilung (SA): “storm detachment;” Nazi Party’s first paramilitary organization; 
gradually replaced by the Schutzstaffel (SS) 
Trümmerfrauen: “rubble women;” term for the women pictured clearing rubble out of 
bombed out sites after the war; images of them used to support the Stunde null myth 
Vergangenheitsbewältigung: “get over the past;” term used in reference to process of 
wrestling with difficult histories of Germany 
Wehrmacht: the unified military forces of Germany under the Nazi Party
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Chapter 1: Postwar Questions 
OCCUPATION BEGINS 
 On May 8, 1945, Germany announced its unconditional surrender to the Allied forces.  
Six years of total war had come to a close in Europe as the United States and Japan continued 
hostilities in the Pacific Theater.  Adolf Hitler’s dream of German supremacy all but disappeared 
as the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and the Soviet Union split the nation into four 
military zones of occupation: the US to the South, the UK to the Northwest, France to the West, 
and the USSR to the East.  As an occupying government, the United States faced a monumental 
task: rebuilding a nation absolutely destroyed by its own war.  Germany’s death toll neared eight 
million people after six years of fighting, its economy was in shambles (destabilized by 
obliterated industrial infrastructure and calls for postwar reparations), and, perhaps most 
devastating to the country, Germany had a global reputation left in shatters with little hope of 
redemption.  Regardless of what policies the Occupying Military Government of the United 
States (OMGUS) adopted in its reconstruction efforts, the US would have to address Germany’s 
Nazi legacy in order to effectively manage the country left in ruins. 
 The moral reconstruction (as opposed to financial, political, or infrastructural 
reconstruction) of West Germany manifested through denazification policy.  The aim of 
denazification in the West was “to destroy German militarism and Nazism and to remove all 
Nazi and militarist influences from public offices and from cultural and economic life of the 
German people.”1  In theory, denazification would cleanse the German government of any ties to 
the Third Reich and create a foundation for the new state to build itself upon.  In practice, 
                                                        
1 Robert Murphy, “The Political Adviser in Germany (Murphy) to the Secretary of State” (US Department of State, 
Office of the Historian, July 7, 1945). 
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however, denazification policies came about in seemingly contradictory forms, each implying 
different levels of responsibility for the war among the German populace, and ultimately creating 
a government with a troublingly significant continuity of personnel. 
 The most famous (or infamous, to some) denazification effort after the war were the trials 
of the Nazi leadership.  The Nuremberg Trials, beginning in 1945, tried twenty-two leaders of 
the Nazi Party and military in an International Military Tribunal (IMT).  Of these twenty-two, 
nineteen were found guilty, and ten were executed while the remaining nine served time in 
prison.2  These twenty-two included the Nazi Party Secretary, a co-author of the Nuremberg 
Race Laws, the original head of the Gestapo, the former Deputy Führer, the chief commander of 
the Einsatzgruppen, and the head of the Hitler Youth program, among others. 
Outside of the original Nuremberg Trials, thousands of less well-known but still powerful 
Nazis were tried in courts across Europe.  In West Germany, the conviction rate for these trials 
was a mere 6.4%.3  The Europe-wide conviction rate, by contrast, was at least 29%.4  These trials 
were meant to offer justice to victims of the war and Holocaust by holding perpetrators 
responsible, however, only a fraction of a fraction of the defendants served the entirety of their 
sentences.  While the highly publicized Nuremberg Trials had a very high conviction rate 
(nineteen of twenty-two), the less well-known trials in West Germany punished very few.  What 
was meant to be a source of closure and justice for victims of the war and Holocaust instead 
                                                        
2 David I. Lippert, “The Eichmann Case and the Nuremberg Trials,” American Bar Association Journal 48, no. 8 
(August 1962), 739. 
3 Michael Greve, Der justitielle und rechtspolitische Umgang mit den NS-Gewaltverbrechen in den sechziger Jahren 
(Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2001), 11, as cited in Devin O. Pendas, “Seeking Justice, Finding Law: Nazi Trials 
in Postwar Europe,” The Journal of Modern History 81, no. 2 (June 2009), 355. 
4 Norbert Frei, “Nach der Tat: Die Ahndung deutscher Kriegs- und NS-Verbrechen in Europa–eine Bilanz” in Frei, 
Transnationale Vergangenheitspolitik, 32 as cited in Pendas, 354. 
The European average was calculated from Norbert Frei’s data which included both those indicted and those 
investigated.  The conviction rate reported here is therefore the quotient of Nazis convicted and Nazis investigated 
or indicted, making it an underestimate of the conviction rate if only those indicted were considered. 
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became a failure of the occupying government to adequately hold those responsible accountable 
for their actions. 
Alongside these trials, the “Subsequent Nuremberg Trials” also failed to hold supporters 
of the regime responsible.  The Subsequent Nuremberg Trials focused on members of the Nazi 
“war machine:” industrialists and leaders of companies that funded the war and Holocaust, and 
SS subsidiaries like the Einsatzgruppen.  Companies like IG Farben (the company that developed 
Zyklon B, the gas used to exterminate millions of Jews in the camps), Krupp Steel (the steel 
giant that used slave labor to manufacture arms for the Third Reich), and others were tried for 
their involvement in the Nazi Party and the death they indirectly (or directly) caused.5  Again 
only a fraction of those indicted were found guilty, and of those sentenced to serve time in 
prison, all were released by American High Commissioner for Occupied Germany (HiCOG), 
John McCloy, in 1951 if still behind bars.6 
 In contrast to the trials of Nazi criminals lie the denazification policies that targeted the 
German population as a whole.  After establishing themselves as an occupying government, the 
US released a six-page questionnaire to every citizen, probing their level of involvement in the 
NSDAP.  The questionnaire, known as the Fragebogen, was implemented in order to determine 
whether a person was to be removed or excluded from the position they currently held or sought 
to hold.7  Based on information from the Fragebogen, even nominal party members would 
require additional screening and evaluation before being hired, including approval of the 
Supreme Commander of US Military Government.8  In addition to the questionnaire, a 
comprehensive reeducation program began in 1945, seeking to reinstitute “universally valid 
                                                        
5 Doug Linder, “The Subsequent Nuremberg Trials: An Overview” (The Truman Library, 2000). 
6 “29 Nazis Leave Prison Today,” The New York Times, February 3, 1951. 
7 Murphy, “July 7, 1945 Telegram.” 
8 Ibid. 
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principles of justice” in Germany.9  The main objective was to “convince the German people of 
their defeat in the war and their responsibility for the inhumane manner in which it was 
conducted.”10  The Fragebogen and reeducation initiatives were designed to act in concert, 
creating a new moral foundation for Germany built with the consent of a nation purged of its 
Nazis past.  The Fragebogen and reeducation policies therefore targeted the entire population, 
unlike the Nuremberg Trials. 
 Beyond the questionnaires and reeducation initiatives, the military government also 
introduced compulsory manual labor for former Nazi party members.  The Allied Control 
Council introduced a series of laws dictating the terms of the new state under Allied command.  
Control Council Law no. 10 permitted the use of hard labor as punishment for party members 
found guilty of membership “in categories of a criminal group or organization declared criminal” 
by the IMT.11  All German citizens were to be registered with the occupation office and could be 
called upon to perform manual labor at the discretion of the Labor Office if they were found to 
be unemployed. 
Denazification in West Germany under the direction of the US occupying government 
appears to have targeted Germany with two drastically different scopes.  While the court systems 
and trials targeted specific individuals, each charged with individual responsibility for the war 
and genocide, the Fragebogen, reeducation policies, and compulsory manual labor orders 
targeted the general public, punishing an entire state.  How could the US justify failing to convict 
and instead releasing high ranking Nazi officials while punishing regular citizens for the actions 
                                                        
9 Archibald MacLeish, “The Assistant Secretary of State (MacLeish) to the Secretary of State” (US Department of 
State, Office of the Historian, July 4, 1945). 
10 Ibid. 
11 Telford Taylor, ed., “Control Council Law No. 10” (Government Printing Office, 1949), Lillian Goldman Law 
Library. 
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of the Reich during the war?  What enabled policymakers to legitimate such contrary policies 
simultaneously when these policies clearly painted very different pictures of war guilt? 
 
THE QUESTION 
 In this thesis, I hope to find this illusive explanation.  While the US is no stranger to 
contradictory policies, it does not pursue these just to confuse political scientists and historians.  
States act with their interests in mind: though they may not always be successful in achieving 
their objectives, states are strategic actors.  Through my research, I discuss the mechanisms that 
enabled US policymakers to implement this wide array of denazification policies.  Much of the 
existing literature seeks to answer why policymakers sought out such contradictory policies 
rather than an exploration of how they were able to pursue such trajectories in the first place. 
 From the existing literature on denazification, I have found two main potential 
motivations of policymakers in pursuing such policies.  The first of these potential explanations 
lies with the foreign policymakers themselves and their own relationships with Germany.  After 
a government is defeated and its citizens remain, it is not always clear who the enemy is 
anymore: there is not necessarily consensus as to who the group that needs to be held 
accountable and punished is.  Even during the war President Roosevelt changed his rhetoric 
concerning “the enemy” periodically; sometimes distinguishing between Nazis and Germans, 
while at other times conflating the two into a general “German” enemy.12  While some of 
President Roosevelt’s cabinet saw the German population as victims of a fascist regime, referring 
to Germans as “under the Nazi yoke,” and as “slaves of the state,” others in the cabinet saw no 
distinction between Nazis and Germany: Secretary of the Interior Harold Ickes said in a 1942 
                                                        
12 Ronald R. Krebs, Narrative and the Making of US National Security (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2015), 129. 
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Cabinet meeting, “the goose-step is a perfect expression of the German character.”13  This 
explanation posits that the variation in understanding of German guilt among policymakers was 
what lead to the variation in denazification policy.  The sincerely held beliefs of Presidents 
Roosevelt and Truman (and their advisors) caused discrepancies in the scope of denazification, 
ultimately allowing top-ranking Nazis to walk free while regular German citizens suffered under 
punitive measures for the general public.  Following this sincerely held beliefs explanation, the 
targeted trials of Nazi leadership stemmed from the belief among some officials that Nazis had 
corrupted the German state and the rest of the population had fallen victim to fascism rather than 
been willing participants.  The broad scope of the Fragebogen, reeducation policies, and manual 
labor punishments then stemmed from the other policymakers who viewed Nazism as an 
extension of German militarism and a manifestation of values integral to Germany. 
 A second potential explanation of the motivations behind this contradiction is based in 
the strategic nature of states.  States act strategically to secure their interests and justify these 
actions through legitimation.  If the divide between policymakers was mirrored in public opinion 
about Germany, this would create an environment conducive to strategic maneuvering.  If 
leaders in the US consciously chose to exploit the internal arguments about the need to punish 
Germany by implementing a variety of denazification policies, then the strategic moves 
explanation accounts for this observed discrepancy.  With the deterioration of US-Soviet 
relations, policymakers in the US were more concerned by the threat the Soviet Union posed to 
US interests than they were of a resurgent fascist Germany, and thus chose to prioritize a strong, 
stable Germany over substantial denazification efforts that could potentially cripple the country.  
However, so soon after the war, it was clear that not everyone would realize the strategic need to 
                                                        
13 Ibid, 128, 132. 
Chapter 1 | Speyer Besancon 
7 
prioritize reconstruction over punishment.  By imposing denazification policies that targeted the 
entire population, the occupying government could appear to hold the entire country accountable 
for the crimes of the Third Reich while still allowing many high-ranking officials to secretly 
maintain influence in the new republic.  Implementing this range of denazification policies gave 
the US the ability to strategically and selectively focus on its denazification efforts at opportune 
times.  The strategic explanation accounts for the two contrasting scopes of denazification 
initiatives by considering the importance of legitimation for the US and the strategic benefits the 
US enjoyed by adopting these policies. 
 These two explanations offer potential motivations among US policymakers to 
implement these contradictory policies.  However, my thesis is primarily focused on how these 
policies could be implemented in the same environment rather than why.  To explain the how, I 
suggest that one must look to the contemporaneous narrative landscape to understand the ability 
to legitimate reconstruction policies in Germany after the war.  The policies available for the US 
to pursue in rebuilding Germany were dependent on what public understandings of German guilt 
already existed.  While the first two explanations attempt to decipher the motivations of foreign 
policy officials in the postwar period, this third explanation instead questions whether 
motivations are even relevant to this discussion.  The legitimation process influences how the 
state identifies threats to its national interests and therefore also influences what solutions are 
viable choices for the state.14  Unsettled narrative landscapes lack a single dominant narrative: 
instead there are multiple narratives in the public sphere each with relatively equal legitimacy in 
the eyes of the public.15  In the US at this time, the narrative landscape (an unsettled one) 
                                                        
14 Stacie E. Goddard and Ronald R. Krebs, “Rhetoric, Legitimation, and Grand Strategy,” Security Studies 24, no. 1 
(2015), 7. 
15 Krebs, Narrative and the Making of US National Security, 33. 
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allowed foreign policymakers to switch between these two scopes of denazification.  Regardless 
of whether US policymakers had sincerely held differences in belief of German guilt or whether 
personal perceptions of German guilt were irrelevant to their postwar planning, the public 
perception of German guilt (that is, the narrative landscape) impacted what denazification 
policies could be pursued.  The multiple understandings of German guilt after the war allowed 
President Truman’s foreign policy advisors to recommend these policies of different scopes. 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 In the existing literature about the reconstruction of Germany after World War II, there 
are essentially four schools of thought that explain the nature of United States-sanctioned 
denazification.  These three seek to address the motivations of occupying authorities and their 
plans for Germany in terms of realizing American interests in Europe. 
 
Strategic Denazification through Democratization 
The first (and most popular) of these three labels the denazification efforts by the US as a 
strategic move: the US considered its actions in Germany in the greater context of Cold War 
politics.  With the defeat of the Nazis, the US’ most threatening enemy in Europe was now the 
Communist Soviet Union.  What was once an unlikely alliance between capitalists and 
communists was now void without a common enemy on the continent.  US policy in Europe, 
then, was now defined by the Red Menace. 
Thomas A. Schwartz writes about the goals of the US High Commission in Germany (the 
presiding US government organization), conceding that not all leaders agreed on what the “right” 
postwar Germany would look like, but that there was consensus about the best outcome for 
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Germany: it would be “a politically stable, Western-oriented, democratic Germany, with a 
market-oriented economy and institutionalized protection for individual rights.”16  His work 
focuses primarily on the push for the successful democratization of West Germany, a feat the US 
government believed could only be achieved if the High Commission first restored the economy 
and bettered US-German relations.17  Aggressive denazification methods that targeted the entire 
population were not conducive to winning over the general population and would not make 
forming a well-staffed government easy: most of the German population was at least in some 
way connected to the party if not actively involved.18  In order to manage the Soviet threat in the 
East, the US believed denazification needed to be sacrificed for the sake of democratization: a 
counterintuitive notion; what democracy could be secured if it was built on fascist foundations? 
Similarly, Arthur D. Kahn uses an example from the trial of Nazi industrialists to show 
the anti-Soviet (as opposed to anti-Nazi) justification most US officials employed in their 
treatment of Germans.  Richard Freudenberg, the largest shoemaker in Germany and a wealthy 
Nazi loyalist who served as a regional economic adviser to Bormann and a die-hard Nazi, was 
brought to German denazification court after being arrested immediately for his involvement in 
the regime.  If found guilty, his personal wealth and positions would be seized by the court and 
his position of power in industry suspended.  Freudenberg was found not guilty of any crimes (a 
common outcome for many Nazi industrialists), but interestingly the Political Adviser on 
Germany, Robert Murphy, justified the verdict citing the protection of private property as a 
foundation of US standards and claiming that to strip Freudenberg of his wealth would be 
                                                        
16 Thomas A. Schwartz, “Reeducation and Democracy: The Policies of the United States High Commission in 
Germany,” in America and the Shaping of German Society, 1945-1955 (Providence: Berg Publishers Inc., 1993), 36. 
17 Ibid, 35. 
18 Clara Menck, “The Problem of Reorientation,” in The Struggle for Democracy in Germany (Chapel Hill: The 
University of North Carolina Press, 1949), 306. 
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reminiscent of the Russians.19  Again US actions in Germany were a product of anti-Soviet 
thinking rather than anti-Nazi.  The ideological push towards a capitalist democracy and away 
from communism served as the primary objective for the United States.  All denazification and 
reconstruction policies enacted were implemented as steps to create a capitalist democracy in 
West Germany under United States supervision. 
 Lastly, Walter Isaacson and Evan Thomas in their book and Hans Meyerhoff in his 
chapter discuss the strategic nature of US policy in Germany.  The US HiCOG, John McCloy, 
prioritized his belief that a revitalized Germany was critical to a rehabilitated Europe over his 
anti-German sentiment leftover from the war.  McCloy criticized “the amazing docility and 
acquiescence of the greater part of the German people toward Nazi outrages,” yet he still 
advocated for merciful reconstruction policies that would enable the population to form a new 
government and empower them to embrace Western democracy.20  McCloy is most infamously 
known for commuting the sentences of Nazi war criminals, releasing them from prison in 1951.  
With the onset of the Korean War, the Soviet threat was more than just a specter to McCloy and 
the West: the Soviet Union was now engaged in direct combat with its former ally. 
 Meyerhoff attempts to account for the seemingly lackluster attempts at denazification 
within the government and major industries.  He begins by outlining the known dilemma for the 
Allied occupying government: it was easy to identify who in the government needed to go, but 
harder to determine who was eligible to replace them.21  The Allied forces wanted to establish an 
efficient domestic government quickly, and thus their moral motives (proper denazification) 
                                                        
19 Arthur D. Kahn, Experiment in Occupation: Witness to the Turnabout: Anti-Nazi War to Cold War, 1944-1946 
(University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2004), 132. 
20 Walter Isaacson and Evan Thomas, The Wise Men: Six Friends and the World They Made: Acheson, Bohlen, 
Harriman, Kennan, Lovett, McCloy (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1986), 516. 
21 Hans Meyerhoff, “The Reconstruction of Government and Administration,” in The Struggle for Democracy in 
Germany (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1949), 199. 
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were subordinated to ideological and political motives that considered administrative efficiency 
in making new appointments.  According to Meyerhoff, denazification efforts were not as 
substantial as they likely should have been, but were as substantial as they could have been. 
 All of these authors who outlined the democratizing, ideological nature of US 
involvement in the reconstruction of Germany are able to explain the motivations of the 
government in ending denazification early and weakening the goal of the initiative, but fail to 
explain what allowed such a policy to ever be introduced in the first place if adequate 
denazification would so clearly hamper reconstruction efforts.  This literature equates “going 
easy” on Nazis with allowing Germany to blossom into a democratic and economic power, but 
are those necessarily the same?  Would the German economy really suffer if Richard 
Freudenberg didn’t get to keep his boat? 
 
Punitive Denazification 
 A second explanation of US denazification policy in Germany is more punitive in nature, 
calling denazification efforts a product of anti-German sentiment in the US leftover from the 
war.  Two authors I encountered supporting this punitive explanation focused on the Morgenthau 
Plan specifically: an infamously vengeful plan for postwar Germany, named after its author, 
Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau.  James Tent depicts Secretary Morgenthau as an 
irrational man, fixated on punishing Germany indiscriminately for its actions during the war.  
Under Morgenthau’s plan, Germany would be dismembered into two small states, with its 
eastern portion ceded to Poland, France gaining control of the Saar in the West, and the 
internationalization of the Ruhr.22  German industry would be completely torn apart, its ability to 
                                                        
22 James F. Tent, Mission on the Rhine: Reeducation and Denazification in American-Occupied Germany (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1982), 17. 
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wage war on the continent obliterated forevermore.  The Morgenthau Plan, however, was never 
adopted by the occupying government and ultimately Morgenthau was delegitimized, accused of 
not acting in the national interest but rather out of his own desire for vengeance on behalf of his 
fellow Jews.23  Tent’s discussion of denazification as a punitive measure, therefore, is incomplete 
without a thorough explanation of the plans that were implemented (unlike the Morgenthau 
Plan). 
 Konrad Jarausch’s work goes beyond Morgenthau’s anti-German sentiments, saying such 
rhetoric could be found throughout United States culture.  Jarausch explores the widespread anti-
German sentiment in the US, citing comments from President Roosevelt equating Nazism to 
Prussian militarism and comments from US public figures like journalist Raymond Daniell who 
said: “Slowly Europe and the world are growing to realize… that the German people themselves, 
and not just the Kaiser or Hitler, are what we have to contend with, for in any people who can sit 
idly by and not protest such actions there is some grave moral lack.”24  Most interesting, 
however, is Jarausch’s analysis of the achievements and failures of denazification after the war. 
He claims that under denazification efforts, the US successfully kept any politician with a 
significant Nazi past out of positions of major authority and that Nazism as an ideology was 
thoroughly discredited through the Nuremberg and subsequent trials.  How, then, does one 
explain the rise of Kurt Kiesinger to the Chancellery in 1966?  Kiesinger joined the Nazi Party in 
1933, quickly rose through the ranks of the Foreign Office, and became the department’s liaison 
with the Propaganda Ministry.25  If Nazism as an ideology was successfully discredited after the 
sentencing of Nazi war criminals at Nuremberg, what does their release from prison by John 
                                                        
23 Krebs, Narrative and the Making of US National Security, 140. 
24 Konrad H. Jarausch, After Hitler: Recivilizing Germans, 1945-1995 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 47. 
25 Ralf Beste et al., “From Dictatorship to Democracy: The Role Ex-Nazis Played in Early West Germany,” Der 
Spiegel Online, March 6, 2012, sec. International. 
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McCloy after less than a decade of serving their time mean?  Lastly, Jarausch implies that those 
who call US denazification insubstantial believe denazification efforts in the Soviet zone were 
because they had a higher conviction rate than the West.  One can take issue with both forms of 
denazification, however; it is well documented that the Soviets purged much more than just 
Nazis from government.26 
 Like its strategic counterpart, the punitive explanations of denazification also fail to 
account for the entirety of the postwar moment.  While they explain why denazification started, 
the desire to punish Nazi Germany cannot explain why many top-ranking officials and 
industrialists walked free.  If foreign policy advisors drafted the denazification initiative with the 
sole intent to punish the country, they would have (1) embraced the Morgenthau Plan, and (2) 
targeted the entire populace rather than letting war criminals go free. 
 
Democratization and Punishment in Denazification 
 The third explanation of denazification is an amalgamation of the first two: it depicts 
parts of postwar policy in Germany as a strategic move to counter Soviet ideological aggression, 
and others a product of anti-German sentiment designed to punish the country.  Anne Pierce’s 
book is a prime application of this frame of thinking: in it she describes the “reorientation” of US 
foreign policy from punitive measures in the very early years of occupation, to the strategic call 
for integrating the German state into the European and world economies.27  According to Pierce, 
as early as 1946 there were signs of the US prioritizing restoring Germany over punishing it.  
Officials believed German integration with Western Europe was the best way to curb German 
                                                        
26 Quinn Slobodian, “Blind Spots: Jews and the Nazi Past in East Germany” (Lecture, February 8, 2016). 
27 Anne R. Pierce, Woodrow Wilson and Harry Truman: Mission and Power in American Foreign Policy (London: 
Praeger, 2003), 203. 
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extremism from both the right and the left (Nazis on the right, Communists on the left) and form 
a healthy, stable, Western democracy.28  Pierce even acknowledges the difficulty in justifying 
restorative policies towards Germany to the US public, citing a statement from the Department 
of State in 1948 introducing the objectives of the Marshall Plan: “The fundamental objective of 
the United States with respect to Germany is to insure that Germany does not again menace the 
peace of the world and makes a vital contribution to the economic rehabilitation and political 
security of Europe.  It is desirous, in the words of Secretary Marshall, that ‘a peaceful Germany 
with strong democratic roots, take its place in the European and world community of nations.’”29   
 Similarly, Harold Zink classifies US foreign policy towards Germany into three distinct 
phases, each one with its own driving force.  From the beginning of occupation until July 1947, 
US foreign policy was largely administered on a punitive basis, as marked by the implementation 
of directive JCS 1067.30  The directive prohibited fraternization between US officials and 
German citizens, prohibited the use of US funds to rebuild German industry, and considered all 
Germans to be a menace to humanity and guilty of crimes against humanity and the peace.31  The 
second phase, from July 1947 to the Berlin Blockade in 1948 and 1949, was a transitional period 
that marked a shift from punitive measures towards a more pragmatic approach.  It was 
characterized by the introduction of a new directive, JCS 1779, which outlined more liberal 
economic provisions while still maintaining restrictions on German remilitarization.32  The third 
and final phase of German reconstruction policy, from the end of the Berlin Blockade to the end 
of occupation in 1955, was the final development into a strategic posture towards Germany.  The 
                                                        
28 Ibid. 
29 Ibid, 204. 
30 Harold Zink, The United States in Germany, 1944-1955 (Princeton: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1957), 93. 
31 Ibid, 94. 
32 Ibid, 96. 
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Berlin Blockade showed the extent of the Soviet threat, and the shift in foreign policy after 1949 
was a product of this realization.33  While Zink’s classifications neatly isolate some contradictory 
policies, his timeline does not explain why it took until 1951 for McCloy to release Nazi war 
criminals nor why responses to the Fragebogen (or Meldebogen, its successor) continued to be 
used for employment eligibility after 1947. 
 Most importantly, between Pierce’s and Zink’s shifting eras of US intentions towards 
Germany, there is no explanation of what makes this debate even possible.  Regardless of 
whether foreign policy makers were trying to punish Germany, reeducate it, or stabilize it, there 
was still this discrepancy in scope of denazification policies.  Studies of US intentions do not 
adequately account for this gap in scope and, ultimately, the debate over intentions is 
unproductive.  In this thesis I explore the significance of narrative landscape in the postwar 
United States and Germany and explain why shifting intentions were even possible during this 
time of reconstruction. 
 
Rhetorical Politics 
Rhetorical politics is the study of public justifications of policy and attempts at 
legitimation.  Rhetorical political scientists concern themselves with how states and leaders 
justify and market their desired policies to other groups and the manner in which they present 
their ideas.  Grounded in the principles of constructivism, rhetorical politics relies on the public 
legitimation of policy for the bulk of its analysis.  In my discussions of narrative, I will 
contribute to discussions of legitimation, outlining the role narratives play in this process and 
why they should be included in studies of grand strategy formation. 
                                                        
33 Ibid, 98. 
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In his book, Ronald Krebs loosely outlines the role narrative landscape plays in 
legitimation, claiming “unsettled situations” (where a dominant narrative is lacking) are prone to 
debates of broader scope because politicians and activists can “legitimately, without penalty,” 
advance a wide range of policy stances grounded in the variety of narratives present.34  The 
narrative landscapes (or as Krebs calls it, “situations”) affect the legitimation process as they 
control what policies are eligible for legitimation; in order to effectively legitimate a policy, a 
corresponding narrative is necessary.  Stacie Goddard’s article with Krebs outlines the 
importance of legitimation in the making of grand strategy, also hinting at the significance of the 
discursive context under which a policy is legitimated.35  My research builds upon their work 




 Much has been written on the nature of Cold War era US foreign policy and grand 
strategy, generating various understandings of the behavior of the US after World War II.  My 
work with this research adds to the existing literature, linking theoretical understandings of 
narrative, legitimation, and grand strategy to the empirical data of postwar US German 
reconstruction debates.  The United States has developed a brand that depicts the US as the 
protector of rights and liberties, giving the country the unquestionable moral high ground in most 
conflicts with other states.  What, then, does it mean for the US’ legacy if its government 
                                                        
34 Krebs, Narrative and the Making of US National Security, 33. 
35 Stacie E. Goddard and Ronald R. Krebs, “Rhetoric, Legitimation, and Grand Strategy,” Security Studies 24, no. 1 
(2015), 27. 
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prioritized stabilizing Germany and creating a strong capitalist ally against the Soviets over 
adequately addressing the Nazi legacy? 
 Germany is also often the subject of debate between memory historians in deciding 
whether the German government has done enough in addressing its past and taking responsibility 
for the war.36  The word most attributed to this topic, Vergangenheitsbewältigung, stems from 
the words Vergangenheit (the past) and bewältigen (to overcome) and is used to describe the 
phenomenon in Germany of acknowledging and wrestling with its Nazi legacy.  These debates 
mistakenly identify Germany as the sole actor in addressing Nazism and reconstructing the state 
in the years after the war.  With the US and other Allied powers occupying Germany and 
dictating the terms of reconstruction and denazification, how can we hold Germany solely 
responsible for the outcomes of these policies?  This is not to say Germany had nothing to do 
with the outcomes of denazification, but it seems it is often unfairly singled out as the sole actor 
while the US is not forced to consider its role. 
 The theoretical portion of this thesis explains how narrative landscape affects the 
generation of grand strategy.  Stacie Goddard and Ronald Krebs have written about the role that 
legitimation (the public justification of a given policy) plays in the generation of grand strategy, 
but my work will also weave in the significance of the preexisting narrative climate in how 
policies are legitimized.  They touch on the significance of context in determining whether 
attempts to legitimate succeed or fail, claiming challenges to grand strategy during “settled” 
times generally fail because these challenges are deemed unrespectable or unworthy of attention.  
This thesis works to further address how grand strategy emerges during “unsettled” narrative 
landscapes and how this situation can potentially be exploited for strategic purposes. 
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 This research challenges how we study the formation of grand strategy and encourages a 
more holistic view: considering not just policies enacted, but also the narrative environment 
under which these policies are crafted.  I argue that the narrative environment is inherently a 
factor in the establishment of grand strategy and thus must be considered when analyzing 
American grand strategy.  The second chapter of this thesis explores this link between narrative 
and policy more thoroughly, showing how narrative landscape enables certain policies to 
succeed on the public stage. 
 
THE METHODOLOGY 
 To pinpoint the nature of the “unsettled” narrative environment after the war, I conduct a 
cultural study of the United States, spanning from the years leading up to the war through the 
Truman administration: approximately 1939-1952 (1939 because this was the year the war in 
Europe officially began despite the US not joining the fight until the end of 1941, and 1952 
because this was the last full year of the Truman presidency).  This cultural study uses 
newspapers, magazines, and films to identify categories of narratives of Germany and Germans 
in the United States during this time.  Various depictions in the media of the country and its 
population are indicative of the range of narratives surrounding Germany after the war and thus 
this cultural study establishes an understanding of which narratives were dominant during this 
“unsettled” time. 
 In order to accurately show the use of the narratives identified from the cultural study in 
the public legitimation attempts by policymakers, access to their correspondence, office 
memoranda, public documents of occupation, and other relevant papers is needed.  Through 
these documents, I identify the primary narratives they reference in their attempts to legitimate, 
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and categorize their justification efforts by narrative used.  Where multiple, contrasting 




Chapter 2: Narrative Theory 
Before anything can be said about the Nuremberg Trials or Fragebögen, a discussion of 
narratives and legitimation must be had that outlines the importance of these two in US foreign 
policy strategy.  These denazification policies alone mean nothing without a theoretical 
background that explains how the US government was able to endorse both measures 
simultaneously.  In this chapter, I explain the concepts of narrative and legitimation, and relate 
them to the formation of US strategy abroad, specifically in reconstruction-era Germany. 
 
NARRATIVES AND LEGITIMATION 
In any given community, there are common understandings that develop over time based 
on communal beliefs and identities.  These understandings serve as a lens through which 
members of the community relate to information and analyze it.  Though they are at times 
difficult to identify and pinpoint due to their engrained nature, narratives can be deciphered 
through cultural analyses of mainstream media.  The identification of narratives is crucial to 
understanding foreign policy strategy because narratives enable the pursuit of specific policies: a 
claim explained further below.  But first, a definition of narrative is needed. 
 
Defining the Narrative 
 “Narrative” is one of those words in the social sciences that seems to mean something 
different to each author.  Marie-Laure Ryan has done most of the work in summarizing these 
various definitions in her chapter of David Herman’s book The Cambridge Companion to the 
Narrative.  She comes to the conclusion that all definitions of narrative in some way relate to a 
“story” (the “story” including a spatial/temporal dimension as well as a mental one that gives the 
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characters of the narrative agency), but many go beyond the mere “story” and demand the 
inclusion of a formal and pragmatic dimension. 37  This dimension considers the relationship 
between the individual and the story, necessitating that the story communicates something 
meaningful to its audience.  For the purposes of this thesis, I include this pragmatic dimension; 
narratives affect the way audiences think and analyze information, and therefore something 
meaningful must be relayed to the audience through the story told.  I define narrative as the 
meaningful representation of specific events, people, or ideas; this includes how the story is 
represented as well as the details of the story.  While the details are important to how audience 
members may react, the manner in which this information is relayed (the word choice, the tone 
and emphasis, the context, etc.) is also a key determining factor in how one relates to and 
analyzes a piece of information.  Narrative, therefore, is based in both content and delivery, and 
narrative analysis must encompass both of these factors. 
 Markus Kornprobst has developed a four-pronged definition of “composite 
commonplace” (or for the purposes of this thesis: content).  Kornprobst, basing this tetrad off of 
Kenneth Burke’s dramatistic pentad, outlines four components of a story: scene, agent, purpose, 
and means.38  These four elements of storytelling encompass the content of the narrative.  
Kornprobst explains “scene” as the environment which the actors operate in, considering what 
threats and opportunities exist in this environment.39  The “agent” is the primary actor operating 
in this environment, interacting with other secondary actors as friends or foes.40  The “purpose” 
                                                        
37 Marie-Laure Ryan, “Toward a Definition of Narrative,” in The Cambridge Companion to Narrative (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2007), 22–38. 
38 Markus Kornprobst, “Building Agreements Upon Agreements: The European Union and Grand Strategy,” 
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is the interest of this agent in the scene: the motivations and objectives of the agent.41  Last is the 
“means,” which Kornprobst explains as the mechanisms of power the agent uses to realize its 
interests in the scene.42  Together these four components of the story convey the content of the 
narrative. 
 These four components of content are only one half of narrative.  The other half is based 
in delivery, of which I have also identified four constituent components, inspired by Goddard 
and Krebs’ list of factors that affect the success of legitimation attempts.43  Goddard and Krebs’ 
list outlines five factors that can either make or break an attempt at legitimating policy, but I 
posit that because legitimation relies on successfully relating a policy to a dominant narrative, 
their five factors of successful legitimation in fact outline the five components of narrative.  One 
of their factors, however, is content, which I have separated into a category of its own (above).  
The remaining four components they have identified are based in delivery and I coopt these four 
remaining components for my analysis of delivery. 
The first of these four is the “speaker.”  The “speaker” (writer, director, producer, 
publisher, sponsor, etc.) of the story is responsible for the delivery of the message.  The authority 
and reputation of the speaker affects the power of the message and its reception to the audience.  
The second component of delivery is the context in which the message is delivered.  This is the 
time and place the message is delivered, as well as the potential references the story may invoke 
and connotations it may evoke.  The context influences how the message is received based on 
events that have recently happened or are in the public consciousness, the symbolic meaning of 
the location in which the message is delivered, or any number of other contextual significances. 
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43 Stacie E. Goddard and Ronald R. Krebs, “Rhetoric, Legitimation, and Grand Strategy,” Security Studies 24, no. 1 
(2015), 26. 
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 The third aspect of delivery is the audience which the message is intended for and 
delivered to.  The audience affects how the narrative is received because audiences have 
different biases and understandings that impact how they relate to and analyze the message.  
What may resonate with one audience may appear completely foreign to another.  The intended 
audience impacts how the message is crafted and delivered, and the audience to which the 
message is actually delivered affects the reception and retelling of the narrative.  The fourth and 
final component of delivery is the technique with which the message is delivered.  The technique 
encompasses the tone and placement of emphasis on words when spoken, the acting choices 
made in a film or play, the lighting and costumes for a scene, etc.  The technique is crucial to the 
formation of narrative as it is the way in which the story is told to the audience and therefore 
received by the audience. 
Together, the content and delivery (and their four respective components each) relay a 
meaningful narrative to an audience.  A speaker effectively gives an account of an event or idea 
to a specific group by using a particular technique and in a specific setting (who says what when, 
where, how, and to whom).  Once formed, narratives are disseminated through the work they are 
manifest in: films in theaters, reviews of books in newspapers and magazines, speeches, works of 
art, etc.  But why are these narratives important in analyzing foreign policy strategy and how do 
they affect what policy options are available to officials? 
 
Legitimation through Narrative 
 In short, narratives are relevant to discussions of foreign policy because they are the basis 
of legitimation in grand strategy formation.  Goddard and Krebs have written extensively (both 
together and separately) about the role legitimation plays in international relations.  In her latest 
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book, Goddard succinctly explains the process of legitimation: “A state legitimates its actions 
when it appeals to recognized norms and rules to justify its demands to its audience.”44  Officials 
seeking to legitimate preferred policies refer to narratives that mimic their line of reasoning in 
order to justify their positions.  In order to ensure the “buy-in” of the public, some kind of public 
justification is required.45 
Though her discussion of legitimation focuses primarily on the legitimation of states’ 
actions to the international community, Goddard’s definition still applies to domestic 
governments as they must do the same with their own citizenry in order to garner public support.  
Legitimation is a crucial step in the implementation of foreign policy, depending on the 
government’s need to mobilize the public and the visibility of the policy in question.  
Legitimation is necessary whenever mobilization on the behalf of the government is desired (no 
matter how visible the policy may be within the public sphere), or when there is a reasonable 
chance that the policy will garner widespread attention even if mobilization efforts are not 
necessary.46  Legitimation is therefore an obstacle officials must conquer on the steps to 
implementing effective foreign policy.  How, then, does narrative fold into legitimation? 
First let us look at Goddard’s and Krebs’ definitions of legitimation.  Goddard defines 
legitimation as the appeal to recognized norms and rules to justify a state’s demands to its 
audience.47  Krebs defines legitimation as “the articulation before key publics of publicly 
acceptable reasons for concrete action and policy positions.”48  Both Goddard’s and Krebs’ 
definitions include the use of “recognized norms” or “acceptable reasons” as integral pieces to 
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justifying policy: in order to secure public support, officials rely on commonly held beliefs as the 
basis for their justifications.  Justifying policy by referencing a norm that is not shared by the 
audience will be ineffective because a belief is invoked that is not commonly shared: effective 
legitimation relies on the use of widely accepted beliefs. 
The commonly shared beliefs, norms, or reasons used in legitimation are in fact 
narratives.  Narratives that are concordant with the preferred policies are chosen as a means of 
appealing to an audience for support.  Beyond matching the policy desired, the selected 
narratives must be widely circulated and believed in order to be effective mechanisms of 
legitimation.  Krebs posits that narratives “channel” political contests, “privileging particular 
courses of action and impeding the legitimation of others.”49  The policies that are discordant 
with the existing dominant (widely-shared) narrative are deemed illegitimate and therefore are 
far less likely to be effectively pursued by the government.  Narratives are therefore invaluable to 
the foreign policy strategy formation process because they enable policies to be enacted. 
As a mechanism of legitimation, narratives therefore affect the formation of grand 
strategy.  Narratives shape grand strategy by defining the “national interest,” identifying threats, 
limiting acceptable policy solutions, and mobilizing publics and resources.50  Once an issue is 
identified as a part of the “national interest,” it immediately is seen as legitimate because it has 
been woven into the narrative of “national interest.”  The identification of threats for the state 
relies on narrative: groups or organizations adopted into the “threat” narrative are then deemed 
legitimate threats to the state.  The narrative landscape also limits what policy solutions are 
accessible to officials when formulating grand strategy because justifying a policy requires a 
matching widespread narrative.  Lastly, the ability to mobilize publics and resources relies on 
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narrative because without a legitimate cause, mobilization efforts will fail.  Grand strategy 
therefore relies at least in part on the perception of its legitimacy (and therefore narrative 
capabilities). 
 
Settled and Unsettled Narrative Landscapes 
When a single narrative is able to achieve dominance over other related narratives, this is 
what Krebs calls a “settled narrative situation.”  In such a situation, the dominant narrative is 
used by officials to legitimate their preferred policy, though it does not necessarily secure 
complete consensus of policy.51  The scope of policy debate is limited to only options supported 
by this single narrative, however multiple (similar) policies can be supported using the same 
narrative.  In settled narrative situations, a single narrative is dominant and only a limited 
number of policies can be legitimated (and these policies are unlikely to heavily contradict one 
another in objective). 
But what happens when there is no single dominant narrative?  In complex bodies with 
members of a diverse range of backgrounds, the establishment of a single dominant narrative that 
is not challenged by another legitimate, contrary narrative is far from certain.  Krebs outlines 
such a scenario, referring to this as an “unsettled narrative situation.”  These situations lack a 
single dominant narrative and are instead replaced by multiple narratives in the public sphere 
with relatively equal legitimacy.52  In such environments, the scope of debate is much broader 
because policymakers can legitimately, without penalty, put forth a wide range of policy stances 
grounded in the existing variety of narratives.53  Unlike in its settled counterparts, unsettled 
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narrative situations can sustain contradictory policies because these can be legitimated via 
different, contrary, codominant narratives. 
Unsettled narrative situations emerge after moments of crisis where existing dominant 
narratives are challenged by new narratives or where the dominant narrative succumbs to internal 
fissures stemming from the inherent contradictions.54  This thesis considers post-WWII society, 
specifically the United States and Germany from 1945 to 1952: a time marked by massive 
changes and crises.  During this time, the Soviet Union transformed from an ally to an enemy, 
and Germany transitioned from the greatest threat to American interests in Europe to a means of 
securing American interests abroad.  Prewar and wartime narratives mixed with this new postwar 
narrative of “the enemy,” creating an unsettled narrative landscape. 
 
OPERATIONALIZING NARRATIVES 
This thesis’ discussion of narrative and legitimation is centered in American foreign 
policy strategy towards Germany after World War II.  To meaningfully discuss the narratives of 
the time and significance these played in the policies pursued, narratives need to be 
operationalized.  This next section thoroughly explains my methods of identifying and coding 
narratives of Germany in American culture during the time. 
 
How to Find Them 
Because narratives are a product of culture, cultural analyses can be used to identify and 
analyze them.  Narratives manifest in materials of pop culture: films, novels, television and radio 
shows, plays, works of art, and other pieces of cultural importance.  In order to identify 
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narratives of Germany, for instance, media that portrays Germans or Nazis in their storyline can 
be analyzed.  Narratives of “the German” are shown in portrayals of Germans and Nazis in mass 
media because these are the common associations most citizens would have with “the German.”  
If all Germans in film and television are shown as violent, cruel Nazis, the image of “the 
German” becomes synonymous with the violent Nazi.  However, if Germans are portrayed in a 
range of roles (Nazis and anti-Nazis, violent and peace-loving, etc.), there may not be a single 
dominant narrative of “the German” in American media and instead several may persist that 
contradict one another. 
To determine whether a narrative is dominant or instead shares the spotlight with several 
other codominant narratives, one must consider the level of circulation of the narratives in 
question.  How often are these narratives represented in mass media and how often are they 
invoked during moments of legitimation?  What are the outcomes of those legitimation attempts?  
Narratives that reach a certain level of popularity and familiarity are more likely to have lasting 
effects on the society in which they emerge.  In the United States, for instance, Germany was 
demonized before and during the war due to its increasingly aggressive and morally corrupt 
actions throughout the 1930s and early ‘40s, and these narratives lasted far beyond the end of the 
war.  Though Germany became an important ally in Cold War foreign policy for the United 
States, the image of the rule-obsessed, fascist-like German remained in many popular portrayals 
of Germans and Germany.  This pattern allows formerly singularly dominant narratives to 
become codominant with other, newer narratives that are growing in popularity.  These times of 
transition between dominant narratives (unsettled narrative landscapes) are prime times to search 
for narratives because media materials will contain a number of representations of the same 
topic. 
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How to Code Them 
Once a narrative has been identified, an analysis is needed to attribute meaning to the 
narrative.  Simply noticing the presence of multiple narratives means nothing without an 
understanding of what these stories mean in the greater context of legitimation: what do these 
narratives represent and imply?  What kind of policies would these narratives legitimate?  
Sympathetic or ruthless ones?  Targeted or general policies?  Aggressive or defensive measures?   
To best understand the framework that goes into analyzing narratives, I have developed 
an analogy.  Imagine a narrative as a single wave in the ocean.  Waves have three aspects to 
them to measure: their direction, amplitude, and duration or frequency.  The direction being 
which way it deviates from the water line: positively or negatively, the amplitude being the 
height of this deviation, and the duration being how long this wave lasts for.  In narrative 
analysis, direction is how the narrative in question portrays the subject studied: positively or 
negatively.  The amplitude is how widespread the narrative is within the society: how well is it 
circulated and how impactful is it on societal norms and perceptions?  Lastly, duration is how 
long the narrative is continuing to influence the social consciousness.  The process of narrative 
analysis must consider these three aspects of the narrative and seek to measure them 
(qualitatively or quantitatively, in the case of duration). 
The first of these three, direction, considers the nature of the portrayal.  This thesis is 
concerned with the portrayal of Germans, Nazis, and Germany in American media of the 1940s, 
and thus my cultural analysis considers the portrayal of characters that fit into these categories.  
Were these characters in the role of protagonist, antagonist, or both?  Were they portrayed in a 
sympathetic manner to the audience that showcased a human side or were they one-
dimensionally evil?  Did the characters’ motives appear justified through the plotline?  Did their 
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motives or personality change over the course of the story?  These kinds of questions shed light 
on the nature of the portrayal and what they show about the subject considered, ultimately 
determining whether the portrayal is a positive or negative one. 
After direction is amplitude.  One must consider how widespread the story is in popular 
culture and the reactions the audience had to the portrayal.  Were these narratives represented in 
multiple forms of media from a range of authors?  A single portrayal of the subject studied does 
not necessarily mean the narrative significantly impacts societal understandings and perceptions 
of the subject studied.  Even if this single story is widely consumed, it is unlikely to be a 
dominant (or codominant) narrative if it has not spurred other stories that depict the subject in a 
similar manner.  Other questions to ask are whether audiences reacted positively to the 
narratives, believing their depictions of the subject studied.  If it was a sarcastic or satiric 
representation, did audiences realize this when watching or was it taken at face value?  The 
extent of circulation and reactions to the narrative are important to analyzing the amplitude of its 
impact on society. 
Lastly, a timeline of the narrative must be established in order to identify its duration: 
how long was this portrayal impactful on societal perceptions of the subject?  This step is rather 
straightforward, but an important one because it is what determines whether the narrative is 
singularly dominant or instead codominant with another narrative (or two).  Were multiple 
narratives widespread at the same time or was there a transition from one to another?  When 
multiple waves interact with one another, there is interference: waves with opposite directions 
can cancel each other out, otherwise identical waves that are out of sync can create aberrations in 
amplitude as they overlap, or other modes of interference.  The same occurs when multiple 
narratives are codominant at a given time.  As explained earlier, unsettled narrative landscapes 
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have far more diverse discussions of potential policies to pursue because there is a wider breadth 
of policies that can be legitimated due to the range of narratives in play.  Settled narrative 
landscapes, however, are limited to policies that can be legitimated from the same singularly 
dominant narrative and thus are less likely to differ greatly in their objectives. 
 
CONCLUSION 
This chapter theorized the importance of narratives in discussions of foreign policy 
strategy.  Much has been written about the role legitimation plays in the formation of grand 
strategy, but this thesis seeks to take this one step further, postulating that narratives are the 
rhetorical basis of legitimation.  Discussions of the legitimation of foreign policy are therefore 
incomplete without a study of the relevant narrative landscape and analysis of how these 
narratives connect to policies pursued. 
Narratives, the basis of storytelling and argumentation, are formed by popular portrayals 
of a subject in the media.  Narratives consist of two aspects: content and delivery.  Content can 
be broken down into four constituent parts: scene, agent, purpose, and means.  Delivery can also 
be separated into four factors: speaker, context, audience, and technique.  Once formed and 
widely circulated, these portrayals become a part of the social fabric, influencing how people 
relate to and react to new information.  In order to identify popular narratives of an era, a cultural 
study must be conducted that collects and analyzes mass media (films, newspapers and 
magazines, novels, art, etc.) and assesses the portrayal of the subject studied.  The analysis of 
these narratives is based in measuring (qualitatively or quantitatively) the direction, amplitude, 
and duration of the narrative. 
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Discussions of the postwar moment in the United States must include an analysis of the 
narrative landscape because these stories were what informed the public justification of policies 
relating to Germany.  As explained in the previous chapter, there are essentially three schools of 
thought that explain motivations of US reconstruction efforts in West Germany.  All three 
theories, however, fail to explain how contradictory reconstruction and denazification policies 
could coexist.  In the next chapter, I outline in detail what these denazification and reconstruction 
policies were and who they affected.  In the fourth chapter, I show the results of my cultural 
study and begin a thorough discussion of the narrative landscape in the United States during this 
time.  In my fifth and final chapter, I relate these policies to the narratives used to legitimate 
them, showing how the two are inherently connected and discussions of policy without 
discussions of narrative are incomplete. 
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Chapter 3: Rebuilding from the Ground Up 
 As the United States assumed control of Germany alongside the other victorious powers 
(the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, and France) after the war, its foreign policymakers were 
tasked with the mammoth responsibility of reconstructing Germany while ensuring it atoned for 
crimes committed during the war.  As their alliance from the war became obsolete, US-Soviet 
relations degenerated and the US began to perceive its greatest threat in Europe to be, instead of 
Nazis who had by now been conquered, the Soviets.  Though the US, UK, and France had 
learned to cooperate relatively well among their respective sectors, to the East, the Soviet Union 
had molded East Germany into an extension of the Kremlin’s power: a move seen as 
fundamentally threatening to the existence of Western influence in Germany.  The prospect of 
German reconstruction had thus become entangled in US-Soviet relations and considerations of 
the “Red Threat” were inherently linked to any reconstruction or denazification policies in 
Germany. 
Alongside the considerations of Soviet-occupied East Germany, the memory of World 
War I and the Treaty of Versailles were also in the minds of policymakers.  The treaty had been a 
source of power for nationalist resentment in Germany during the interwar years and had become 
a major rallying point for the Nazi Party.  US policymakers were not eager to make the same 
mistakes again during this round of postwar negotiations and reconciliation.  This meant the 
occupation policies pursued would have to strike a balance between punishment and 
reconstruction: too harsh and the German people would continue to hate the West for its 
vengeful spirit, but too ineffectual and a resurgence of Nazism would be possible.  This balance 
in punishment and reconstruction, however, did not require the implementation of inherently 
contradictory policies.  As I will show below, even in the very early years of occupation, there 
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were simultaneous efforts by the occupying forces to give more responsibility to Nazi leaders 
while also claiming Germans were inherently untrustworthy and too irresponsible to run their 
own matters.  This tension between punishment and reconstruction did not find a solution 
throughout the years of occupation and ultimately leaders within the Nazi Party were able to 
return to positions of power in the new republic while nominal members were punished for 
allowing these men to be elected in 1933. 
 
ADMINISTRATIVE PLANS FOR GERMANY 
To begin the reconstruction process, the US and its allies founded the Allied Control 
Council (ACC), tasked with overseeing all decisions affecting Germany as a whole.  Via 
unanimous decisions between the four powers, the ACC held jurisdiction over Germany’s 
military, waters, skies, transportation, political spheres, economic and finance matters, 
reparations, deliveries and restitution payments, internal affairs and communications, laws, and 
prisoners of war and other displaced persons, among others.55  The ACC acted as the main 
governing body for the Allies, setting objectives for reconstruction and leading the policymaking 
process from above. 
 In conquering lands during the war that did not belong to it after the Treaty of Versailles 
was signed, Germany was forced to accept changes to its borders by the ACC.  The German 
conquest of the Ruhr Valley and Saarland created the call for a return to the pre-WWII borders, 
and the potential internationalization of the Ruhr and Saar.  The French delegation was 
particularly interested in the concession of the Ruhr to France in order to (1) exploit mining 
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rights in this resource-rich area, and (2) secure the status of a diminished Germany.56  The 
Morgenthau Plan, a plan introduced by Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau, called for the 
complete dismantlement of Germany as a state and the reincorporation of the land into several 
agricultural farms with no industrial capabilities or centralized governments.57  Though this 
proposal was not enacted due to its inability to garner support in DC, the plan was still proposed 
by a high-ranking US official with close ties to Presidents Roosevelt and Truman and parts of it 
later inspired future policies.  Eventually, the four powers agreed to a four-way split of Germany, 
with the UK to the North including Bremen and Hamburg, France in the center-west with the 
Saar and part of the Rhineland, the USSR to the East with eastern Prussia, the US to the South 
with Munich and Frankfurt, and the four-way split of the capital city Berlin.58 
 US occupation policy directly after the war can best be summarized by an excerpt of 
Joint Chiefs of Staff Directive 1067 (JCS 1067): “Germany will not be occupied for the purpose 
of liberation but as a defeated enemy nation. Your aim is not oppression but to occupy Germany 
for the purpose of realizing certain important Allied objectives.”59  As an occupied nation, 
Germany was not a target to be “saved” but rather the spoils of war: its wealth of natural 
resources were to be exploited for Allied interests and its population were under the unchecked 
authority of the four Allied governments. 
This exploitative objective for Germany was best represented in the demilitarization 
process for Germany and the deindustrialization process connected to war industry.  JCS 1067 
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called for the dissolution of the armed forces and paramilitary organizations like the Wehrmacht 
(German Army), Sturmabteilung (SA), and Schutzstaffel (SS) as well as the liquidation of 
German “war plants.”60  Factories were classified as “war plants” by the US occupation 
authorities and, due to bureaucratic discrepancies, many factories were placed in this category 
that could easily have been used for peaceful purposes.61  For example, fertilizer factories in 
West Germany were dismantled and their parts shipped to the Soviet Union (as a part of an 
international reparations agreement with the Soviet Union) despite the demand for fertilizer in 
Germany for crop production (to feed a starving population of civilians).62 
 Of the factories permitted to remain intact, caps were introduced on the amount these 
industries could produce, particularly among heavy industry.  By 1946, the occupying 
government was heavily regulating the production outputs of German industry: the production of 
gasoline and oil, rubber, aluminum, and radio transmitting equipment were outright banned; the  
chemical industry was limited to 40% of its 1936 production capacity; the electrical industry 
limited to 50% its 1938 production levels; and the locomotive industry limited to repairing 
existing stock as opposed to producing new vehicles.63  The production limitations were 
implemented to both limit German war-waging abilities as well as weaken competition for 
industries the Allied governments relied on for exports.  Without German cars in the vehicle 
production market, American car producers could thrive without competition. 
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 Ultimately, the nationwide policies affecting German infrastructure (both military and 
industrial) targeted these sectors in order to limit German capabilities in waging war.  By 
eliminating the German army (Wehrmacht), Germany would have no official mechanism of 
fighting occupying forces.  Without a paramilitary organization like the SS or SA to bolster 
support among civilians through intimidation, Germans would be less likely to organize against 
the occupying governments and instead follow the rules set down by the ACC.  With the 
destruction of any industrial capabilities (both war-related and otherwise), German industry 
would be significantly hampered and the country would have neither the production means nor 
the funds to wage war.  These limitations on German military capabilities would act in tandem to 
ensure control over the defeated nation. 
 Lastly, the administrative system called for the expulsion of Germans from 
Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland: all countries conquered by the Nazis and which had had 
their native populations forcibly removed by the Nazi government to make room for the 
incoming German population.64  Article XII of the Potsdam Agreement of 1945 called for the 
“orderly and humane” transfer of German populations out of these countries into Allied-occupied 
Germany.65  The removal of Germans from Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland created a 
larger drain on Germany’s already restricted resources and further reminded the German people 
of their status as a defeated nation: an objective listed in JCS 1067. 
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THE DENAZIFICATION PURGE 
 When the Nazis came to power in 1933, they successfully systematically reoriented all 
societal institutions towards the Nazi ideology.  This process, known as Gleichschaltung, 
affected every facet of German society, encompassing the economy and trade associations, 
media, education systems, and even German culture.66  Because the ideology had been so 
engrained in the native culture, the process of purging Nazism from society had to be all-
consuming in order to adequately remove any remnants from German life.  Every government 
official was a member of the Nazi Party (some more involved than others) and essentially every 
civilian was also a member.  This meant that the occupying authorities had millions of people to 
register and determine their level of responsibility for the Nazi regime in order to properly 
wrestle with the Nazi legacy in Germany. 
 
Were you a Nazi? 
 The first step in implementing the purge was the use of the Fragebogen, a 131-item 
questionnaire administered to every single German adult to be filled out and returned to 
occupation authorities.  These questions included personal information (like name, address, 
identifying marks, religion, etc.); schooling information (name and type of school and degree 
received); professional or trade examinations taken; employment and military service history 
(position and rank, duties and responsibilities, location of service if outside Germany, military 
honors received, and reasons for “cessation of service”); organization membership (Nazi Party 
membership or Party-related organizations like the SS, SA, Reichskulturkrammer (Nazi 
organization of culture), Deutsches Rotes Kreuz (German Red Cross, both an extension of the 
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Party as well as a Geneva-Convention-compliant organization), or any other organizations 
besides the more than 50 identified by the questionnaire); the membership of any family 
members to these organizations; one’s voting record from the November 1932 election and 
March 1933 election which brought the Nazis to power; part-time service with any organizations 
not already mentioned above; writings and speeches given since 1923 (subject matter, date, and 
circulation or audience); income and assets since 1931; travel or residences abroad (countries 
visited, dates, purpose of journey, origin of funds used for travel, persons or organizations 
visited); and any other additional information the person wished to report.67  This six-page 
questionnaire was required for any German adult who wished to work, or to continue to work, in 
a public or semi-public position of responsibility or in a leading private enterprise.68  Public 
office would mean anywhere in government, whereas the leading private enterprises included 
civic, economic, and labor organizations; corporations and other organizations in which the 
German government or subdivisions have a major financial interest; industry, commerce, 
agriculture, and finance; education; and the press, publishing houses, and other agencies 
disseminating news and propaganda.69  Those who refused to fill out the questionnaire would be 
forced to accept lower paying jobs in positions that did not require the completion of a 
Fragebogen, mainly involving manual labor. 
 In addition to the Fragebogen which was required among German adults, the completion 
of a Meldebogen was required for access to food ration cards.70  Every resident over 16 years of 
age filled out the Meldebogen, a two-page questionnaire similar to the Fragebogen but not as 
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extensive in nature.71  The information gathered from these questionnaires was cross-referenced 
with Party papers and documents, and classified respondents into one of five categories (major 
offenders, offenders, lesser offenders, followers, and exonerated persons).72  Once placed into a 
category of criminal, the respondent would be subject to punishments for that category (ranging 
from fines and employment/travel restrictions to a life’s sentence in prison or execution).73  
These questionnaires were used across all four zones of occupation (though each zone’s 
questionnaire varied slightly) and became the face of bureaucratic denazification efforts in 
Germany. 
 In order to combat the post-war labor shortage in Germany, the Allied Control Council 
also ordered the registration of all persons capable of work and the assignment of these people to 
manual labor of some manner.74  All men aged 14-65 and all women aged 15-50 were required to 
report to a registration office to show proof of employment or incapacity to work.75  If Germans 
were not working, they would be assigned to manual labor.76  For those who refused to fill out a 
Fragebogen, this meant they would likely be assigned manual labor and thus this employment 
requirement worked as an enforcement mechanism for the questionnaire. 
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In Search of Justice 
 Alongside these questionnaires were the most infamous denazification events of the time: 
The Nuremberg Trials.  This series of trials, held under the jurisdiction of an international 
military tribunal (IMT), tried 22 identified “major offenders” (among them a co-author of the 
Nuremberg Race Laws, the Nazi Party Secretary, a head of the Gestapo, the former Deputy 
Führer, the chief commander of the Einsatzgruppen, and the head of the Hitlerjugend).77  As the 
most widely publicized symbol of denazification, the judgments in Nuremberg were critical to 
the legitimacy of the denazification process: these men on trial were presumably the worst of the 
worst offenders and their punishments would symbolize the status of denazification in Germany 
under Allied occupation.  Of the twenty-two tried, nineteen were found guilty and sentenced to 
years in prison or death (nine sentenced to prison time, ten executed).78  With a conviction rate of 
86%, Nuremberg seemed to signify a success for the punishment of a conquered people.  These 
men would never have been allowed to remain in positions of power in German government, but 
their public punishments paved the way for international criminal law and symbolized a 
successful denazification purge for Allied forces. 
 Though this series of trials was most famous, there were thousands of other 
denazification trials that lasted throughout the postwar era and these numbers were less than 
damning.  Within the western occupied zones of Germany, only 6.4% of those tried for Nazi 
crimes were found guilty.79  This conviction rate is of course lower due to the fact that not every 
person tried was a known war criminal as in the original Nuremberg Trials.  However, 
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considering the fact that the conviction rate for all of Europe was 29%, this low rate for the 
western sectors seems rather low.80  Obviously conviction rates are not directly indicative of 
justice served: the Soviet Union had astronomically high conviction rates in its occupied zone 
because beyond Nazis, the Soviet authorities targeted political enemies criticizing the 
Communist state.  However, a 6.4% conviction rate does seem awfully low considering this 
meant only this small subset of people were forced to pay fines or worse.  The trials of “the rest” 
included a range of people from Nazi officers, to shopkeepers, to industry executives: only 6.4% 
of whom were found guilty of some crime relating to their involvement in the Nazi Party. 
 Among those who were sentenced to prison time, none served extended sentences.  In 
1951, US HiCOG, John McCloy, released all Nazis still serving time in prisons even if their 
sentences were not yet completed.81  McCloy commuted these sentences amidst much 
controversy, claiming it was a practical measure necessary to winning over popular German 
support despite the fact that these men were guilty of war crimes.82  Combining these troubling 
statistics, one sees that a small fraction of the population was convicted of crimes related to their 
involvement with the party, and among this small fraction, some portion were sentenced to an 
extended prison sentence, and none of those sentenced to prison served longer than seven years. 
 
Get Out of Jail Free Card 
The role of the military-industrial complex in the denazification purge was particularly 
peculiar as large industry giants who had supported the Nazi war effort (and in turn been 
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supported by the Nazi Party) were on trial for their crimes while also being tasked with 
improving the German economy as the nation rebuilt.  Companies found guilty of involvement 
with the Party were subjected (at least initially) to dismantling, decartelization, or confiscation as 
agreed to at Potsdam in 1945.83  Due to the Gleichschaltung, the Nazi Party was strongly tied to 
the industry giants of the day and thus a purge of the Party meant a purge of the executives 
running the largest companies.  However, alongside denazification processes were reconstruction 
processes that aimed to stabilize the country and recover some of Germany’s economic 
capabilities.  How would the Allied occupation authorities balance the call for punishing those 
responsible with creating an efficient and effective economic powerhouse for the new country? 
One of the most notorious Nazi industry giants complicit in Nazi war crimes was the 
Krupp steel company.  Krupp Steel funded much of the armament production aiding the war 
effort and employed slave labor from Auschwitz in the production of this weaponry.84  Though 
the denazification policies affecting Krupp Steel forced it to break apart into its constituent 
branches, the loss in profits of this restructuring was a drop in the bucket for Alfried Krupp (the 
CEO of Krupp during this time).  Even after being sentenced to prison (and being released in 
1951 to a champagne breakfast), he remained the wealthiest man in Germany (and likely Europe) 
until his death in 1967 after having returned to his post as CEO in 1951 upon his release from 
prison.85  Krupp Steel later went on to produce trucks for the occupation authorities and 
eventually merged with Thyssen to become Thyssenkrupp Steel in 1997; the company now 
serves as one of the largest steel companies in the world.86 
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Alongside Krupp Steel, IG Farben was the other most infamous company from Nazi 
industry that went through a very public denazification process.  IG Farben was the largest 
chemical producer in Germany, and the company that developed Zyklon B: the gas used by 
Nazis in the gas chambers that killed over one million people in the concentration camps.87  The 
gas was developed, produced, and sold by IG Farben to the various concentration camps by the 
ton; one ton of the gas had the capacity to kill well over 300,000 people.88  After the war ended 
and Allied forces gained control of the country, the directors of the company were arrested and 
brought to trial.  These trials were a portion of the “Subsequent Nuremberg Trials,” held from 
1947-48 and saw twenty-three IG Farben directors indicted.  Of the twenty-three, thirteen were 
convicted of crimes and sentenced to prison time, ranging from one and a half years to eight 
years.89  Just as with Alfried Krupp, the directors still serving their sentence in 1951 were 
released by HiCOG John McCloy and went on to enjoy highly profitable and respected post-
release careers.90  As for the company itself, IG Farben was required to break down into its 
constituent parts: BASF, Bayer, Agfa, and Hoechst.91  BASF is now the largest chemical 
producer in the world, specializing in the production of chemicals and plastics.92  Bayer is the 
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other most powerful of these subsidiary groups that still exists today, specializing in 
pharmaceuticals and agricultural science, specifically pesticides and herbicides.93  Despite the 
fact that IG Farben was required to separate into its constituent companies as a punishment, these 
individual companies did not struggle to continue to make a profit and continued to operate as a 
cartel after the initial dissolution process. 
Though Krupp Steel and IG Farben were the most well-known industry giants working 
with the Nazi government, many other businesses benefitted from their close ties with the Nazis 
and went through denazification processes as well.  The Hugo Boss fashion brand was not 
always known solely for its men’s suits: Hugo Boss was an avid Nazi supporter, joining the party 
in 1931, far before it had amassed control of the German government.94  In 1933, Hugo Boss 
began manufacturing Nazi uniforms and continued this production throughout the war, relying 
on forced labor in the later years of the war.95  After the war ended, Hugo Boss was classified as 
an “offender” (category 2) under Control Council Directive No. 38, until he was reclassified as a 
“follower” (category 4) and forced to pay a fine for his crimes during the war.  The Hugo Boss 
brand continued to be known as a respected label and make millions of dollars in profit after the 
war, a product of getting its first large contract with the Nazi government. 
Beyond the manufacturing industries of Nazi Germany, the banking world supported the 
Nazi regime by lending the funds necessary to the construction companies tasked with building 
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Auschwitz.96  The bank serviced accounts for the Gestapo, depositing proceeds from auctions of 
property confiscated from deported Jews.97  As punishment, Deutsche Bank was forced to 
dissolve into 10 separate regional banks, however by 1950 these separate banks had coalesced 
again into Deutsche Bank: the European powerhouse we know today.98 
German industry and finance undeniably supported the Nazi war effort throughout the 
1930s and war, and the denazification process sought to hold these organizations responsible for 
their collaboration.  The accountability process consisted of trying the executives most 
responsible for the actions of the company, sentencing them to prison, releasing them in 1951 to 
return to their position on the executive board, and allowing the company to go on to make a 
sizeable profit.  This process targeted specifically these high-ranking executives most 
responsible, but the punishments for their crimes failed to truly hold these men accountable 
because there were no lasting consequences.  While the questionnaires and manual labor 
requirements affected the entire population, the trial process targeted those on top but failed to 
create long-term costs for Nazi-involvement. 
Ultimately, this meant regular civilians were initially punished just as much as those who 
had committed or helped commit war crimes, but these high-ranking executives had million-
dollar companies to return to and Allied government contracts to benefit from while civilians 
starved on ration cards and were forced to work manual labor sites due to their ties to the Nazi 
regime.  Regular citizens had the same swastika-shaped stain on their Fragebögen as the industry 
executives did but lacked the leadership positions that made such stains a selling point.  The best 
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Nazi to be after the war was the second most powerful man in the room: too high ranking and 
they would land in Nuremberg, too low and they would not have the skills or connections to lend 
towards rebuilding Germany.  The US wanted the educated, skilled Nazis capable of planning 
and benefitting from genocide to rebuild Germany, not a secretary too incompetent to benefit 
from war crimes. 
 
DEMOCRATIZING GERMANY 
Though the Nazis rose to power in a democracy, their prompt elimination of the 
democratic system convinced the occupying US forces that a return to democratization would rid 
the country of any fascist tendencies.  Alongside denazification efforts was the major push 
towards democratization, rooted in the American tradition.  This meant that as the US claimed 
most Germans were not trustworthy enough to work in public office, they were granted the 
ability to vote in elections for public office.  This tension between denazification and 
democratization was one of many contradictions in postwar German reconstruction.  
Democratization efforts would entail the formation of political infrastructure and a constitution, 
and the reeducation of the public. 
 
Legalizing Political Infrastructure 
 In 1947, Secretary of State George Marshall outlined the basic principles of 
democratization in five points.99  Firstly, a uniformly effective guarantee of human rights “in all 
parts of Germany” was required: even under the western-oriented liberal democracy of the 
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Weimar Republic, the respect of human rights was not central to the constitution.100  The second 
principle protected the freedom of political action for recognized political parties whose leaders 
were democratically elected by and responsible to their members.101  The legalization and 
support of political parties that respected the democratic process would prove fundamental to the 
foundation of a new politically engaged Germany.  The third principle outlined the significance 
of freedom of action in all parts of Germany for free and democratic trade unions.102  Directly 
after the war, the freedom to assemble had been suspended by the Allied government until some 
form of order was established on the ground.  Under the Nazi regime, trade unions had been 
integrated into a single organization: the Deutsche Arbeitsfront (German Labor Front) which was 
the single largest mass-membership organization under the Nazi government at 25 million 
people.103  The legalization of independent trade unions was a concrete way of undoing the work 
of the National Socialists. 
 The fourth principle outlined by Secretary Marshall was the free circulation throughout 
Germany of information and ideas by all media of information, subject only to needs of military 
security and prevention of Nazi or militarist resurgence.104  The protection of free press and 
speech in Germany was another method of distancing the new nation from its Nazi past, allowing 
Germans to print and say what they please.  The fifth and final principle protected the freedom of 
movement for persons and goods throughout Germany, limited only by the requirements of 
military security.  All of these principles specified their applicability to “all of Germany,” 
therefore including East Germany.  As a product of the Cold War, the foundation of the Federal 
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Republic of Germany (the unified West German nation) was in part based in its contrast to its 
eastern neighbor.  By unifying the three western zones into one country, many were concerned of 
the potential negative impact on reunification prospects.105  For this reason, these 
democratization principles were meant to also apply to the East, forcing the Soviet’s hand to 
acquiesce to seemingly basic democratic principles. 
The shift by the Allied forces towards a democratic society signaled a change in how 
Germans were viewed by the Allied administration: previously the Germans were considered too 
dangerous to have the authority to run government, but now they were allowed (if not 
encouraged) to take control of their nation.  The immediate postwar Germany was not considered 
capable of democratic thought, but after a mere two years, a universal push towards 
democratization had taken hold among occupying authorities.  How could a country where much 
of the public was banned from holding public office possibly create and participate in a robust 
democracy? 
 
Forming a Constitution and Government 
Firstly, Germany needed a constitution to organize its government with.  The German 
Grundgesetz, or Basic Law, began its development under the occupying western powers (the US, 
UK, and France) in July 1948.  These three hoped to bring West Germany together under a 
western-oriented democracy that could combat the Communist threat in the East.  The Western 
Allied powers required some basic principles to be included in the document and reserved the 
right to approve or reject the set of laws as a whole, but generally outsourced the rest of the 
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development to West German political elites.106  A committee was founded by the German Land 
(state) government, populated predominantly by politicians and lawyers from the Weimar era 
because many of the younger generation had been banned due to their involvement in the Nazi 
regime.107  Allied authorities told the Parliamentary Council that the new Basic Law should 
prioritize the protection of human rights, outline a parliamentary democracy governmental 
structure for Germany, be based on a form of federalism that would centralize the German 
government, create the Federal Constitutional Court, and preserve the outlined governmental 
structure by forbidding any fundamental changes to the essential tenets of the Basic Law after 
the constitution is ratified.108 
 This constitution outlined a governmental structure for Germany that would democratize 
from the bottom up.  Government began at the local level with Gemeinden (towns) run by a 
mayor or town council, then Kreise (districts, either Landkreise/rural districts or 
Stadtkreise/urban districts) encompassing several Gemeinden, and finally Länder (states).109  The 
Land governments would adopt state constitutions, drafted by popularly elected assemblies and 
ratified by electorates.  The basic principle of Allied-ordered democratization was that 
administrative authority and responsibility would be transferred to Germans at all levels, with the 
military government retaining only the right of general surveillance to insure the achievement of 
occupation objectives.110  A provisional centralized German government would be created to 
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address pan-German problems and policies, focusing especially on matters of the economy and 
finance.111 
 The transfer of authority from Allied hands to German ones was a gradual process that 
forced the readmittance of former Nazi Party members into the fold of public service.  By 1949, 
an American report found that 85% of civil servants originally removed by denazification 
policies were back, and 30-60% of the Bavarian (the state in which Nazism first emerged) Land 
elected officials were ex-Nazis, in charge as the constitution was written and ratified.112  By 
1950, 25% of all departmental heads in Bonn ministries were ex-Nazis.113  In 1951, the Christian 
Democratic Union (CDU, the German conservative neoliberal party) and Socialist Democratic 
Party of Germany (SPD, the German socialist liberal party) passed the 
Entnazifizierungsschlussgesetz (law to end denazification) with bipartisan support which allowed 
all but categories I and II (major offenders and offenders) to return to their jobs in civil 
service.114  By 1952, two-thirds of officials in the foreign ministry were ex-Nazis.115  Over the 
course of four years, the German government had been transferred from the Allies back to the 
Germans, and those previously banned from public office were welcomed back.  The population 
had changed from the greatest threat to US interests in Europe, to an important democratic ally 
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A Lesson in Civics 
Lastly, to ensure a full shift to a democratic society, the US employed a series of 
reeducation initiatives in Germany to reorient the population towards the desired ideals.  The US 
occupying government sought to create a new Germany by teaching the population a new set of 
values and norms. 
The first way this began was through the school system itself: Hitler had controlled an 
entire younger generation through his Hitlerjungend program, and the US saw the potential to 
coopt this strategy for democratization instead of Nazification.  To reorient the German 
education system, the US relied on removing teachers and materials related to the Nazi regime 
and replacing them with US-approved personnel and curriculum.116  Based on a 1946 report on 
reeducating Germany, the occupation authorities completely changed the structure of the German 
education system, eliminating the “track” system from a young age that would determine 
whether a student would go on to study at a university as early as the age of nine.117  This 
system, the report found, “cultivates attitudes of superiority in one small group and inferiority in 
the majority members of German society, making possible the submission and lack of self-
determination upon which authoritarian leadership has thrived.”118  In place of such a structure, 
the report called for the integration of the various tracks into one comprehensive secondary 
school that all pupils would attend for another six years (after six years of elementary school): by 
creating a common core curriculum for all Germans, they hoped this would create a common 
culture for all students and thus become the basis for a robust democracy.  The new curriculum 
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under US occupation introduced democratic social studies as either a teaching principle or an 
actual subject taught in classrooms.119   
Alongside the schools themselves, the occupying authorities also employed the use of 
films in the reeducation process for greater Germany.  Though school children were an important 
demographic to win over (as they would be in charge of the democracy one day), the adult 
population would be voting in elections in the years to come and would need to be taught the 
nature of democracy.  To begin this, the US introduced mandatory film screenings in many 
cities, using documentary footage of the war and Holocaust as a way to force the public to 
wrestle with the atrocities committed under the guise of “nationalism.”  Mandatory screenings of 
Die Todesmühlen (The Death Mills, 1945) showed the German public documentary footage of 
the Nazi death camps, forcing Germany to watch as bodies left behind after the SS fled the camp 
as soldiers approached, were bulldozed into mass graves by American GIs.120  These film 
screenings were used not just as a reeducation tool, but also as a shaming mechanism, designed 
to guilt the Germans into compliance.121  At screenings of this film, the OMGUS employed 
social scientists to collect and interpret viewers’ reactions of the film in order to measure the 
status of reeducation in Germany.122  Interpreters found, however, that German audiences did not 
appear as moved by such documentaries as many had hoped, and the reeducation-through-
atrocity-film strategy did not appear to be as effective as expected.  The US then shifted away 
from an openly political agenda to mass manipulation by harnessing the power of cultural 
imports.  They could promote political and economic interests far more effectively by holding re-
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releases of films from old Hollywood.123  Films were used as a reeducation tool, first to elicit 
sensations of guilt or remorse, then to draw parallels between German and American cultural 
interests and values. 
 
CONCLUSION 
The story of denazification in Germany is one of contradictions.  While the US called for 
the reconstruction of Germany, it simultaneously stripped its industrial capabilities and shipped 
its factories out of the country.  While those most responsible for the war were released from 
prison to return to their high-paying jobs in German industry, regular citizens continued to 
struggle to make ends meet after their party membership had banned them from their previously 
held jobs.  Though denazification policy outlined a process for the private sector (which had 
undeniably colluded with the Nazi Party), it seemed to only ever truly reach political offices. 
The most significant takeaway of this outline of denazification is the discrepancy in who 
the policies affected and how it affected them.  The employment restrictions stemming from the 
Fragebogen, the manual labor requirements, and the ration cards administered from Allied 
Command created a very low standard of living within West Germany in the years directly after 
the war.  JCS 1067 had ordered that US forces “take no steps looking toward the economic 
rehabilitation of Germany [nor steps] designed to maintain or strengthen the German 
economy.”124  When JCS 1067 was replaced by JCS 1779 in 1948, three years of suffering under 
the brutal Carthaginian peace had already created a resentful German population.  Meanwhile, 
the trial system had failed to convict many of the people responsible for the war, and of those put 
behind bars, many were released early in 1951 if not sooner.  The industries that had most 
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supported the Nazi regime were barely punished for their role in war and genocide, and their 
executives quickly returned to positions of power and wealth after a swift prison sentence.  How 
could US officials call the general populace too untrustworthy to work in public office while 
allowing industrialists to run free, tasked with running German industry? 
There was a constant push throughout the denazification process to give Germans more 
responsibility in their own country, all the while assuming Germans were fundamentally anti-
democratic and would only assume democratic responsibility after being shamed and 
indoctrinated into the tradition.  How could US officials push for democratization and open 
markets while also enabling war criminals to fund this rebuilding?  Most importantly, what 
explains these differences in scope between policies?  What was it about the situation that 
allowed policymakers to pursue these different policies?  This is not a discussion of why these 
policies were enacted, but rather how multiple policies that contradicted one another could be 
legitimated at the same time. 
  
56 
Chapter 4: “The German” 
 Given the variation in reconstruction and denazification policies enacted in Germany 
after the war, what enabled the occupying government to legitimate such a wide array?  As 
explained in Chapter 2, narrative landscape is a key determiner in legitimating policy.  The 
United States’ foreign policy options in West Germany depended upon the US population’s 
views of Germany and its people.  If Americans universally believed all Germans were evil and 
incapable of atonement, the State Department would have a difficult time explaining why the 
courts had released many war criminals from custody.  On the other hand, if Americans 
identified regular German citizens as victims of the Nazi regime, State would need another way 
of justifying their employment and ration restrictions on most German citizens beyond a punitive 
explanation.  So, what did Americans think of Germany and its people during the war and the 
years after? 
 
CULTURAL STUDY METHODOLOGY 
 To attempt to understand the narrative landscape of the time, I conducted a cultural study 
of the United States from 1939 to 1950: spanning from the start of World War II (though before 
the US had entered the war) well into Truman’s second term in office and into the US’ 
occupation of Germany.  As explained in Chapter 2, narratives can be identified through the 
analysis of popular media.  This media can include periodicals, films and television, novels, and 
art among other things.  Because this chapter focuses on the narratives surrounding Germans 
(namely the US public perception of Germans and Germany), my media analysis focuses 
primarily on media with depictions of Germans throughout the 1940s.  Though the policies 
considered in Chapter 3 were all enacted after the war ended, narratives from during the war 
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were the ones that would be most salient after V-E Day.  Postwar reconstruction policies relied 
on narratives of Germans and Germany from during the war in order to legitimate their postwar 
plans.  The depictions of Germans and Germany in the years after the war are also important for 
analysis, however, because these could also be used for legitimation once circulated enough.  For 
this cultural analysis, I looked at various films (explained in greater detail below) and articles 
from three popular magazines of the time. 
 Films in the 1940s were a staple of general consumption in the US: Hollywood’s film 
industry was both a window through which citizens could see past their immediate world, and a 
mirror which the public could use to better understand their own communities.  Film was (and 
still is) an incredibly effective way of influencing opinion through narrative storytelling or 
documentary formats.  The influence of film in US culture cannot be understated, especially its 
motivating power in the later years of the war such as the documentary series Why We Fight 
(1942-45) which was based off of Leni Riefenstahl’s Nazi-sponsored “documentary” of the Party 
Convention in Nuremberg, Triumph of the Will (1935).  Film propaganda was used in earnest by 
both sides during the war as a means of connecting the home front with the men fighting and 
vice versa.  Film is an excellent source of narratives for this study because these were widely 
circulated pieces that informed their audiences about Germans and Germany.  Depictions of the 
two in film were one of the few ways the majority of the American public would interact with 
them and access was easy enough that films could be well circulated easily.  I compiled a list of 
films ranging from 1939 to 1946 that depicted Germans or Nazis which I then analyzed in order 
to identify narratives of Germany from the time. 
 The first five films on this list were released before the US ever joined the war.  The first 
of these films, Confessions of a Nazi Spy (1939), is a spy thriller and the first anti-Nazi film 
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produced by a major Hollywood studio.  Though the US had not yet joined the war effort, the 
threat of Nazi Germany was growing in the international sphere and had spilled over into 
Hollywood’s purview.  Confessions of a Nazi Spy follows the illegal actions of an underground 
Nazi spy ring running out of New York City and sensationalizes the propagandic strategies of the 
Third Reich.  The second of the list, Charlie Chaplin’s iconic 1940 hit The Great Dictator, was 
especially controversial in its outright mockery of Hitler and Mussolini and its calls against anti-
Semitism.  Chaplin’s film follows the life of a Jewish barber who fought for “Tomainia” 
(Germany) in the first world war and awakens to find his beloved homeland has been taken over 
by a dictator named Hynkel (Hitler) who conveniently looks exactly like him (both the barber 
and the dictator are played by Chaplin). 
 The third film, a melodrama entitled The Man I Married (1940), follows an American 
woman and her German husband’s trip to Germany in 1939.  While there, her husband is 
seduced by a fervent Nazi woman and leaves his American wife for the Nazi Party and the Nazi 
woman.  The fourth, the Three Stooges famous 1940 slapstick short You Nazty Spy! (1940), 
explains how the industrialists in “Moronika” (Germany) artificially create a dictatorship with a 
puppet dictator in order to boost arms sales.  Their chosen dictator, “Hailstone” (Hitler) is a 
bumbling fool who maintains power through the help of his Field Marshall and Minister of 
Propaganda.  The fifth and final film of this era is Underground (1941), an American film 
depicting the German anti-Nazi resistance movement from the perspective of two brothers 
caught on opposite sides of the fight.  One brother leads the resistance through his illicit radio 
broadcasts while the other, a Nazi soldier, has just arrived home from the front after losing his 
left arm. 
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 The next three films of my list were produced while the US was actively engaged in the 
war or in the years immediately after.  The first, and arguably most famous film produced during 
the war, is Casablanca (1942), which follows the cynical expat Rick, running a café in Morocco 
which is frequented by refugees trying to leave fascist Europe.  Though there are few Germans in 
the film, the relationship between Nazi officer Strasser and the Vichy forces is of particular 
interest to me as it sheds light on the degrees of responsibility Americans may have been 
attributing at the time.  The second film from during the war, Address Unknown (1944), tells the 
story of a San Francisco-based German expat gallery-owner who moves back to Germany and 
joins the Nazi Party while there, isolating himself from his lifelong German friend back in San 
Francisco.  This film is especially interesting for its distinction between Nazis and Germans and 
the effect being in the “fatherland” apparently has on Germans. 
The last film on the list was produced after the war ended, depicting postwar life and 
politics.  Orson Welles’ The Stranger (1946) follows a war crimes investigator tracking down an 
escaped Nazi convicted of genocidal war crimes.  The Nazi flees to a small town in Connecticut 
and has set up a new life for himself there while the investigator attempts to identify “the 
stranger” in the town.  The Stranger is also the first melodrama to use documentary footage of 
the concentration camps, documenting the gas chambers and human destruction ordered in the 
camps. 
Alongside these films, I also analyzed various issues of popular periodicals of the time, 
specifically Reader’s Digest, The New Yorker, and Life.  These magazines were catered to the 
home front, delivering news as well as opinions to the general population.  Writing about issues 
of interest and relevance to “the average Joe,” magazines had the power to set agendas and 
inform public opinion.  Reader’s Digest in particular was marketed specifically as a general-
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interest family magazine, unlike Life and The New Yorker which had more journalistic and 
artistic inclinations.  The sixteen articles I considered from these three periodicals range from 
1940 to 1950, incorporating editorials, excerpts from non-fiction books, and op-eds of the time, 
all relating to Germany, Germans, Nazis, and/or reconstruction policy. 
Through my analysis of these different films and articles, I considered specifically how 
Germans were depicted and what mechanisms were used to paint Germans in this certain light.  
Using the definition of narrative I explained in Chapter 2, I considered both the content of these 
films as well as the delivery of them: the public response to them, the direction choices, etc.  As 
in Kornprobst’s explanation of the content tetrad, I analyzed the scene, agent, purpose, and 
means of the German in each film.  What role did the German play within the plot of the story 
told: were they the protagonist, antagonist, or perhaps merely an obstacle to the protagonist?  
What were the German’s motivations in their actions and how did they present themselves?  
Were they written or directed as a sympathetic character: flawed but human, or wholly evil 
through and through?  For the delivery of the film, I considered the circumstances in which the 
film was produced and screened, the directorial and acting choices made, the audiences the films 
were designed to be shown to (predominantly family-oriented commercial audiences), and the 
people most obviously related to the film. 
Throughout the cultural narrative analysis, I was especially interested to see in what 
scenarios a distinction was made between Nazis and Germans and in what scenarios such a 
separation was not made.  The American understanding of the German psyche was a fascinating 
thing to discern and painted a chaotic view of who “the German” was.  This study is not included 
to determine which of these representations was correct, but rather to outline what kind of 
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depictions of Germans Americans were faced with each day during this time and therefore what 
narratives were available to policymakers for legitimation attempts. 
 
WHO IS “THE GERMAN?” 
Unsurprisingly, there was no single view of who “the German” was.  Before the US and 
Germany were at odds in the twentieth century, Germany was considered the motherland for 
many German-Americans and German immigrants living in the states.  Germans had brought 
with them concepts like kindergarten, Christmas trees, and hot dogs: all important pieces of 
American culture then and now.  As one of the largest immigrant populations in the United 
States, German culture and identity quickly became intertwined with American culture and 
identity.  After the US joined the war effort against Imperial Germany in 1917 and again against 
Nazi Germany in 1941 however, Germany also had a new meaning in American lexicon: “the 
enemy.”  Given its both positive and negative connotations in American culture, how did 
Germany’s image shift over time?  Did one replace the other or was it possible for the two to 
coexist?  My cultural study of the United States in the 1940s depicts the narrative landscape of 
Germans and Germany in the eyes of the average American. 
In my study, I found three categories into which depictions of Germans in mass media 
can be sorted.  The first of these made no distinction between “the German” and “the Nazi.”  
This association of Germans and Nazis was at times explicit, but more often than not was 
implicit: most authors equating the two would not even mention Nazis and simply describe the 
atrocities Germans were committing in the name of their Führer.  The second of these categories 
was just the opposite: those that made a clear delineation between “the German” and “the Nazi.”  
These authors and directors made distinctions between the cruelty of the Nazis and the passive 
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actions of the Germans, painting active Nazis as evil but the general German populace as 
staunchly ideologically opposed to Hitler’s fascism.  The third and most complicated of the 
categories was something in between, manifested in several ways.  Authors and directors in this 
category made a partial distinction between Germans and Nazis by using some sort of caveat or 
asterisk.  Some did this by depicting Nazis as evil beings apart from the select few who could be 
rehabilitated through exposure to empathy or democracy: two things sorely lacking in the Third 
Reich.  Others made the distinction between Germans and Nazis partial by showing some 
Germans who will fall for fascism by being in Germany but other Germans who are safe from 
this seduction by remaining in the United States.  In both cases it was exposure to these 
American values that saved the German from becoming a Nazi: in the first it is a cure to Nazism 
that has already taken root, while in the second it is a preventative measure that helps the 
German resist Nazism altogether. 
 
Germans are Nazis are Germans are… 
 This first depiction of Germany and its population was consistently used throughout this 
time period, spanning from before the US joined the war through the beginning of the 
reconstruction process in West Germany.  The militaristic stereotypes of Prussia and the wicked 
cruelty of Nazism were attributed to German traditional values and culture.  The evil of Nazism 
was portrayed as a linear progression of German militarism, things intrinsic to each German 
citizen.  This narrative of equating all Germans to the evil Nazis regularly mentioned in the news 
effectively made all Germans responsible for the decisions of the top tier. 
 The two films that most embodied this depiction were Irving Pichel’s 1940 film The Man 
I Married and Orson Welles’ 1946 film The Stranger.  In The Man I Married, Carol Cabot, a 
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successful American art critic working in New York City, visits Germany with her husband, Eric 
Hoffman, a German immigrant living in the US for a decade, and their seven year old son, 
Ricky.125  While visiting, Eric reconnects with an old childhood friend of his, Frieda.  Frieda, a 
vision of Aryan beauty with her blonde hair and blue eyes, is an avid Nazi Party member and 
enthusiastically shows Carol and Eric around the Berlin political scene.  Throughout their visit, 
Carol becomes more concerned that Eric is falling for Frieda and her politics, consistently 
confronting Eric about his feelings for her (and the Party).  Eventually Eric tells Carol he plans to 
divorce her and marry Frieda so he can stay in Germany and support the Nazis as they achieve 
global dominance.  Throughout the film Eric transforms from a seemingly kind, supportive 
husband to a frenzied Nazi interested in nothing but the preservation of his “home” (no longer in 
New York but instead in Germany). 
 There are several moments throughout the film that show Eric’s fixation on the success of 
Germany at any and all costs.  Before even leaving for Germany, Carol mentions the rumors of 
the conditions in the German camps, but Eric brushes her off saying he is not convinced such 
camps even exist.  Once in Germany, Eric acknowledges the camps exist after it is discovered 
the brother of a friend of theirs in New York has been imprisoned in Dachau for philosophizing 
against the Nazi regime.  Carol wants to find a way to free their friend’s brother, but Eric warns 
her that this brother deserves to be imprisoned for speaking out against Hitler. 
 While driving through a “Czech neighborhood” (Jewish ghetto) in Berlin with an 
American journalist she meets in Germany, Carol witnesses firsthand the abuse of these civilians 
at the hands of Nazi soldiers.  She is appalled and tells Eric what she has seen but he dismisses 
her again, saying “What do you expect? Soft music? This is a revolution, certainly a few people 
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get pushed around… Look at the roads and factories they’ve built!”  That evening Eric, Frieda, 
and Carol attend a rally in the Sportpalast and Carol finds herself in a sea of frenzied Nazi 
salutes and “Sieg Heil!”s, including, to her horror, Eric.  Even after this Carol still believes that if 
she can get Eric out of Berlin he will come to his senses and see the insanity and injustice of the 
Nazi regime. 
 Late that night Eric comes home after attending an event with Frieda and tells Carol he 
can divorce her on grounds of treason: Carol’s lack of support for the Führer is reason enough 
for a German man to divorce his wife.  He intends to keep Ricky in Berlin and raise him as a 
German as is his birthright.  Eric’s father comes in and tells him to reconsider his decision and, 
when Eric refuses, he informs him that Eric’s mother was “a Jewess!”  Frieda hears this and is 
disgusted, leaving Eric behind as Carol and Ricky leave for New York together, without Eric. 
 Every German in The Man I Married is either a fanatic Nazi or Jewish.  This film leaves 
no room for “Aryan” anti-Nazis, making it very clear that even seemingly good Germans who 
have lived in the US for a decade are not safe from their subconscious sympathy for the 
fatherland.  Eric had not been to Germany since coming to New York and (seemingly) happily 
enjoyed his life there, but the moment Germany was criticized in New York he defended it, 
instantly calling the rumors of cruelty merely American propaganda trying to diminish German 
industry.  No distinction is made between Germans and Nazis in the film, in fact Nazism is tied 
directly to German nationalism and industry.  Despite his many years spent in the US, Eric’s 
Germanness cannot be separated from his self and it is what ultimately enables his seduction into 
the Nazi Party and Frieda’s arms.  His obsession with German pride is so strong it overwrites his 
own self-preservation instincts as a half-Jew. 
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 The Man I Married was not very popular at the box office upon its release in 1940.  
Making only $1.7 million in its first year, the New York Times suggested that perhaps anti-Nazi 
propaganda films such as The Man I Married were not popular because audiences were bored by 
the constant evil acts of the Nazis or they objected to “having a philosophic attitude rammed 
down their throats.”126  After its release to theaters, the German Consul contacted Twentieth 
Century-Fox demanding the film be removed from theaters due to its negative portrayal of 
Germany and Germans.127  The Consul threatened to refuse the distribution of any Twentieth 
Century-Fox films in Germany should they not comply, and eventually the film was pulled 
shortly after its release in an attempt to remain neutral in the then-European conflict.128 
New York Times reviewer Bosley Crowther delivered a positive review of the film, 
despite his apparent dislike of the anti-Nazi film genre: “If we are bound to have a succession of 
anti-Nazi propaganda pictures – and there is reason to expect that we are – let’s hope that they all 
may be as restrained in their emotions, as frank and factual in their reports and as generally 
entertaining cinematically as… ‘The Man I Married.’ … For here is a ‘hate’ film which, at least, 
lets the villains speak a word for themselves… The few anti-Nazi films which have come along 
so far have tended toward blind indignation and incipient hysteria.”129  Because of the time of its 
release, it seems the immediate reaction to films like The Man I Married in the US was generally 
negative due to the largely isolationist attitude in the US during this time: no matter how cruel 
the actions of Germany may be, it is not the responsibility of the US to involve itself in European 
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conflicts.  However, the making of this film also shows a more active anti-Nazi sentiment 
growing in the United States even before the US had joined the war effort. 
 The second film that affords no distinction between Germans and Nazis is Orson Welles’ 
1946 picture The Stranger.130  As an investigator for the Allied War Crimes Commission, Mr. 
Wilson tracks down known German war criminal Franz Kindler to Harper, Connecticut.  The 
only problem is, he does not know what Kindler looks like and Kindler has been in Connecticut 
for some time, likely having created a cover story for himself there.  While there, Mr. Wilson 
meets a man named Charles Rankin who is an important pillar of Harper society: a local history 
school teacher and upstanding town citizen, in charge of fixing the clock on the church bell 
tower.  As his investigation continues, Wilson realizes that Charles Rankin is in fact Franz 
Kindler and convinces Rankin’s wife, Mary, to turn on her husband and catch the man who 
supposedly planned the Holocaust. 
 The Stranger leaves no room for a distinction between Germans and Nazis, as the one 
German immigrant shown (Mr. Rankin/Franz Kindler) who appears to be a fine, upstanding man, 
is in fact an unrepentant genocidal maniac still capable of murder.  Throughout the film, 
Rankin/Kindler kills two beings: another Nazi fugitive who finds him in Connecticut and his 
wife’s dog; he also attempts to kill his wife.  It is clear his Nazi tendencies are still a crucial part 
of who he is.  While on the phone with Mary to lure her to her death, he absentmindedly draws a 
swastika on the notepad beside the phone before drawing over it with boxes and ‘X’s.  In order 
to throw Wilson off his scent after being asked of his opinion of Germany, Rankin/Kindler says, 
“For the German, the messiah is not the prince of peace. He is another Barbarossa. Another 
Hitler.”  Mr. Wilson responds, “Well then you have no faith in the reforms that are being 
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affected in Germany.”  Rankin/Kindler responds saying, “I can’t believe that people can be 
reformed except from within. The basic principles of equality and freedom never have and never 
will take root in Germany… Marx wasn’t a German, Marx was a Jew… [The solution is] 
annihilation. Down to the last babe in arms.”  Even while overcompensating for his pride in 
Germany by calling for genocide against all Germans, he still makes the fatal error of othering 
Marx for his Jewish ancestry.  It is this error that tips Wilson off and allows him to identify 
Kindler as the man he is searching for. 
The Stranger was the first film to use documentary footage from the Nazi concentration 
camps in its storytelling, and therefore the first time many Americans would see this footage if 
they chose not to attend documentary screenings.  While trying to convince Mary that her 
beloved Charles Rankin is in fact the infamous Nazi Franz Kindler, he shows her harrowing 
footage from the camps (which Kindler is responsible for in this story), including an enormous 
pile of rotting, emaciated dead bodies, images from inside the gas chambers, and a pit where 
men, women, and children were buried alive.  When Kindler is caught by Wilson and Mary, he 
defends himself, claiming, “It was all their idea. I followed orders… I only did my duty.”  This 
excuse was very common in the years after the war and viewers would have recognized the 
familiarity of such a claim.  Orson Welles’ film made the connection between Germans and 
Nazis impossible to understate and put the horrors of Nazi crimes on full display for audiences 
across the United States. 
In terms of reception, The Stranger was a true box office success.  In its first six months 
in theaters, the film grossed $2.25 million in US rentals.131  Reviews were largely positive, and 
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the film even received an Oscar nomination for best original story (though it did not win).132  The 
sole negative contemporary review came from the New York Times’ film critic Bosley Crowther 
who felt Welles’ portrayal of Kindler “gave no illusion of the sort of depraved and heartless 
creatures that the Nazi mass-murderers were.”133  This is an interesting switch from his tone in 
1940 in regards to The Man I Married.  He went from suggesting that Hollywood was unfairly 
harsh on the Nazis in 1940 to claiming the film industry failed to truthfully depict the wickedness 
of the Nazis after the war ended.  This reviewer’s change of heart in regard to the Nazis mirrors 
the evolution of popular opinion on Nazis: in 1940 the demonization of Germany had begun but 
was not necessarily widely accepted, but by 1946 it was far more widely accepted that the 
Germans had done evil things in the past decade and deserved serious repercussions. 
Beyond the films of the era, many of the pieces an American might read in their favorite 
magazine would make damning ties between Nazism and Germanness as well.  Like the films, 
these articles were not limited to a specific moment: I found articles ranging from 1940 to 1946 
that unabashedly conflated Germans and Nazis.  The articles written during the war (1940-1945) 
generally focused on the threat Germany posed to the United States: either from its fascist 
tendencies, the duplicity of the German people, or traditional German conservativism.  One 
writer wrote explicitly about the fervent hatred Germany had for the US because the United 
States’ existence disproved Nazism’s racial and economic theories.134  Citing the shady business 
dealings Hitler used leading up to the war, he concluded that the US cannot trade with 
“Germans” (not Nazis) ever again due to their lack of moral compass.135  He also cited an 
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editorial in the national Nazi newspaper, Der Völkischer Beobachter, that said, “Justice and good 
nature should be limited to one’s own people;” effectively showcasing the moral corruption of 
Germans using their own words.136 
One fascinating piece spoke about the threat Germany posed, not from the Nazis, but 
from the anti-Nazi traditionalists like the Junkers (land owning nobility from Imperial Germany).  
The author, Henry Taylor, claimed that while Nazis were seeking unfettered expansion to all 
corners of the world at breakneck speed, this expansion was less threatening than that supported 
by the Junkers because Nazism would inevitably fail as it became stretched too thin while the 
Junkers would bide their time for a more favorable opportunity and continue the fight when 
convenient.137  Though he acknowledged that some Germans may not support the Nazi strategy, 
he implied that all Germans were still striving for global domination and were inherently evil in 
this endeavor.  He continued, ironically claiming the racial component of German superiority “is 
not directly related to Hitler,” but in fact “in their blood.”138  While he called the basis for 
German superiority unfounded for its basis in race, he condemned all Germans to this moral 
degradation through their bloodline. 
In general, many of these pieces written during the war used “German” and “Nazi” 
interchangeably, seamlessly equating the two without having to explicitly state the steadfast 
connection implied.  The two articles that addressed the complicity of the population in enabling 
Hitler’s rise to power focused especially on the common “did as they were told” myth 
(referenced in The Stranger), undermining this claim by pointing out the enthusiasm rather than 
cowardice of the German population under Hitler.139  One author claimed that because Germans 
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will always prefer order over revolution, and obedience over liberty, they embraced Hitler 
because he “reestablished authority – which they prefer to responsibility. Here was a man after 
the people’s heart: he did all thinking – and voting – for them, as kings and Junkers had done 
from time immortal.”140  Again the connection was made between Nazis and Germans, outlining 
the specific parts of the German psyche that made them most susceptible to the call of fascism. 
After the war ended, however, most articles written about Germany and Germans related 
to the nature of reconstruction and denazification policy and thus no longer spoke of the threat 
Germany posed to the United States.  Those that still maintained no distinction between Germans 
and Nazis, however, still spoke to the threats Germans posed to Americans even as an occupied 
nation.  One article of this nature was one which talked about the state of West Germany and 
reconstruction efforts in the occupied zone.  This tell-all made several bold claims about the 
German psyche, culminating in the statement: “[Germans] dream of revenge against the people 
who bombed their cities to rubble and upset their profitable domination of Europe. And they 
cling, without contrition, to arrogant militarism, anti-Semitism, and other Nazi ideas.”141  This 
piece and those like it used explicit fear mongering tactics to call for an end to German freedom 
in the name of US national security. 
Media throughout the 1940s had a clear and consistent narrative portraying Nazism as an 
inherently German phenomenon, though the narrative grew in popularity as the war continued 
and after it ended.  These films and articles stressed the origins of the Third Reich and its ties to 
Prussian militarism while skimming over the manipulative and coercive tendencies of Nazism.  
However, this narrative of conflation, while dominant, was not the only major representation of 
Germans at the time.  Alongside these articles and films that drew connections between Nazism 
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and German values were other pieces of work that explicitly made very clear distinctions 
between the two. 
 
Brown Shirts Don’t Go with Lederhosen 
The second common depiction of Germans in mass media of the time was that which 
severed Nazism from its German heritage.  In this narrative, Nazism was considered a perversion 
of traditional German values and Hitler’s evil stemmed from his own fascist leanings rather than 
his country of origin (especially considering Hitler was Austrian, not German).  In discussions 
after the war, the actions of the Nazi regime were attributed to the leaders at the top of the 
hierarchy rather than implicating the entire populace for giving consent.  Debates over the 
origins of Nazism created a completely new birth story that left out the elections that brought the 
Nazi Party to power in the Reichstag and discussions of war responsibility that used this 
narrative made a very clear distinction between classes of criminals (namely Nazis rather than 
Germans). 
There were two films that embodied this narrative extremely well.  The first, Anatole 
Litvak’s 1939 film Confessions of a Nazi Spy, follows the workings of a Nazi spy ring operating 
out of New York City.142  FBI agent Ed Renard is assigned to identify the members of the spy 
ring and stop their intelligence gathering missions.  He finds that Nazi rallies are being held in a 
local New York Biergarten (a German bar) with waitstaff wearing traditional German clothes 
like Lederhosen and Dirndls and identifies several Nazi spies working to steal US military 
secrets.  Using his clever interrogation tactics, Agent Renard manages to get the Nazi spies to 
divulge their secrets to him through flattery and several spies are arrested by the federal 
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authorities.  Those that manage to escape the FBI and flee back to Germany are faced with 
treason sentences by the Nazis who suspect they have divulged secrets and are ultimately 
tortured there. 
Throughout the film there is an underlying theme of discerning the difference between 
Germans (specifically German-Americans) and Nazis.  While the head of this spy ring, Dr. Karl 
Kassell, is holding a Nazi rally in the Biergarten, several spectators start to call out, criticizing 
him.  One German-American heckler calls out, saying, “I am an American of German birth and 
there are hundreds of thousands like me who stand absolutely against you Nazis! …We fight side 
by side for democracy!”  The other German-Americans in the Biergarten follow suit, and a riot 
breaks out between the German-American Nazis and German-American democrats. 
While three Nazi followers are sitting at a table in the Biergarten discussing their 
opinions of the party, one shows his reluctance towards the party and tension between his love of 
Germany and the actions of The Party: “I love my fatherland as much as anyone, but how can 
Americans possibly have decent cultural relations with a regime whose aim is to destroy the very 
best of German culture?”  Again this tension between Nazism and German culture is showcased, 
effectively distancing the evil ideology from its German roots.  The Nazis in the film try to tie 
themselves back to Germany in order to secure support and legitimacy, claiming “No one, no 
matter where he is, can call himself a German unless he is a Nationalsozialist,” but they are 
disproved time and again by the German-Americans calling for an end to Nazism in their 
beloved fatherland. 
Confessions of a Nazi Spy demonizes all Nazis for their deceitful propaganda campaigns 
trying to garner support in the States, while redeeming Germans for knowing to call out fascism 
when they see it.  Nazis are consistently portrayed as hypocrites as well: they rave about the 
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wonders of the fatherland but when sent to Germany by the Party to speak to their superiors, 
every single Nazi is visibly terrified: one even exclaims his fear of the Gestapo specifically.  It is 
also important to realize this film was made before the war even started in Europe (released in 
May of 1939) and long before the United States joined the fight.  There is a consistent call to 
arms as Litvak’s Nazi propaganda sequence shows the spread of Nazi ideology spreading across 
the Atlantic to the United States, infecting the country like a disease.  The constant mention of 
democracy and liberty further cements the damnation of Nazism while absolving non-Nazi 
Germans who demand democracy in their fatherland. 
The film’s director, Anatole Litvak, was himself a refugee of Nazi Germany and sought 
to show the American public the horrors of Nazi Germany despite the fact that until this film, no 
anti-Nazi feature film had yet been made by a major studio.  Similarly to what would happen 
with The Man I Married one year later, after news of the films production was released, the 
German Consul contacted Warner Brothers demanding the film cease production.143  An official 
from Paramount told the producers that if the film were made, Warner Brothers would have “on 
their hands the blood of a great many Jews in Germany.”144  Despite these threats and warnings, 
Warner Brothers went on with production, only to have the Production Code Administration (a 
subsidiary organization of the Motion Pictures Producers and Distributors of America) warn the 
producers that, though the script did not technically violate any provisions of the Production 
Code, it still may be rejected by censor boards out of fear that showing the film would incite 
public disorder or rioting.145 
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Casting the film also proved extremely difficult, as no Hollywood stars wanted to risk 
their reputation on such a controversial film.146  The film enjoyed record-breaking box office 
business around the world, despite being banned in Japan, Germany, Italy, Ireland, Denmark, 
Norway, Argentina, Costa Rica, Sweden, Belgium, Brazil, and others.147  In 1941, both Jack and 
Harry Warner were subpoenaed to a Senate subcommittee hearing to testify on behalf of the 
company after allegations that they had created multiple propaganda films in the studios, one of 
them being Confessions of a Nazi Spy.148  Confessions of a Nazi Spy was easily the most 
controversial film within my cultural study due to the fact that no film like it had ever been made 
before.  War in Europe had not yet begun but Mr. Litvak was determined to tell the stories of 
Nazi evil and warn the rest of the world of the horrors committed across the Atlantic.  The 
controversy surrounding this film stemmed from its negative portrayal of Nazis: it did not 
condemn the entire population of Germans in the world.  Despite its hopeful ending that implied 
true Germans knew better than to support the Nazis and that the Nazis would fail in their 
endeavors, many members of the public found its condemnation of the Nazis too direct for 
peacetime cinema.  However, this belief would change over time as the war began: Litvak’s film 
was the first of its kind to outwardly spurn the Nazis and inspired a slew of directors to do the 
same in the years following. 
The second film that used this distinction narrative was Vincent Sherman’s 1941 film 
Underground.149  This film was especially interesting to me as it followed the (supposedly 
extremely popular) anti-Nazi resistance movement based in Germany.  Underground tells the 
story of two brothers caught on opposite sides of the fight for Germany.  Eric works in the 
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underground anti-Nazi movement, broadcasting anti-Nazi news to Germans via an illicit radio 
station.  Kurt is a soldier in the Wehrmacht and has recently come home after losing his left arm 
at the front.  Kurt has no idea of Eric’s work with the resistance and the two are very close, 
maintaining a strong fraternal bond (despite Eric knowing he disagrees with his brother’s 
politics).  Kurt meets a beautiful young woman named Sylvia and falls in love with her, not 
knowing she is also a member of the resistance movement and works with Eric regularly.  When 
Sylvia tells Kurt she works with the resistance, he is concerned for her safety rather than angry 
she is working against his party.  Seeing her at a meeting with resistance members, he collects 
her and calls the Gestapo to arrest the rest of them, believing this is the only way to save her 
from herself.  However, he does not realize he has called the police on his own brother until it is 
too late and he witnesses his brother’s violent arrest and interrogation at a Gestapo prison 
facility.  Witnessing the violence used against his brother, Kurt realizes the cruelty of the Nazi 
Party and joins the resistance movement to replace his brother after he is executed by the 
authorities. 
Firstly, the film depicts a resistance movement that has widespread support, including 
several spies that have infiltrated the top ranks of the Nazi regime.  It is well documented that 
German resistance to Nazis was not widely popular, and was never formally organized apart 
from a few isolated groups like Die Wieße Rose or the several assassination attempts of Hitler.  
Though the story is clearly fictitious, it does imply that anti-Nazi resistance was popular even in 
the very early years of the war when the Nazis appeared unstoppable in their war effort. 
A neighbor of the brothers visits their father and the two question the point of fighting 
such a war but Kurt interrupts them saying the point is “to restore Germany’s place in the 
world!”  At the start Kurt is depicted as an unquestioningly loyal young man who loves his 
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country and family but perhaps does not fully understand the nature of the side he has pledged 
allegiance to.  As he learns about the practices of the Nazis, Kurt realizes his support of the Nazis 
protects neither his family nor country the way he once believed it to and the National Socialist 
German Worker’s Party is not the party of the German family.  Just as in Confessions of a Nazi 
Spy, the Nazi ideology is shown in direct contrast to the interests of Germans and German values 
of family. 
The unquestioning Nazis depicted in the film, like Colonel Heller, are only ever shown in 
their relation to the Party: it is as though they have no families or life outside the party.  Colonel 
Heller is shown only ever in his office, surrounded by swastikas and imperial eagles.  Meanwhile 
his secretary, who is spying for the resistance, is often speaking to resistance members outside 
the office, maintaining her connections to the world outside the Reich.  It is Kurt’s ties to his 
family that saves him from the moral corruption of Nazism.  Colonel Heller even freely admits 
his loss of morals, saying “If I concern myself with problems of ethics, I’ll soon be out of a job.”  
His world revolves around the party and thus has lost all perspective and his ties to the fatherland 
are instead weakened: love of the Führer replaces love of country. 
Decades after Underground was released, director Vincent Sherman wrote about his time 
working on the film in an autobiography.  Regarding the research process that went into the 
development of the core storyline of anti-Nazi resistance in Germany, Sherman wrote “I dug up 
what I could and persisted in the belief that there were decent people in that country who were 
trying to resist Hitler and his gang. (Years later I, along with others, was appalled at how few had 
the courage to resist and how monstrous was the behavior of the Nazis.)”150  Evidently, director 
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Sherman merely felt resistance in Germany must be widespread because he could not conceive of 
a population not pushing back against such cruelty sponsored by the government. 
The New York Times review of the film was lukewarm at best, saying the film was too 
needlessly violent in its portrayal of Nazis: “The characterization of the Gestapo agent is in the 
film too coldly inhuman to be credible, and his actions frequently pass the limit beyond which 
brutality can be shown on the screen. Beyond that borderline the drama ceases to move the heart 
and instead results simply in visceral shock.”151  Interestingly, the New York Times review 
desired a more sanitized depiction of Nazi violence in Germany despite the fact that much of 
Underground’s violence was an accurate portrayal of Nazi norms.  Underground did not 
experience the same public backlash as Confessions of a Nazi Spy did, likely because the war in 
Europe had begun by this time and its general depiction of Germany was far more forgiving than 
Confessions’ portrayal.  However, this film was still produced before the US had joined the war 
effort and isolationism was not gone from public consciousness: though Nazi crimes were less 
deniable than they had been before war broke out in Europe, the responsibility of the US to do 
something about Nazi aggression remained to be seen. 
Alongside these two films, there were also several magazine articles that made clear 
distinctions between Germans and Nazis, disputing the ties Nazism claimed to Germany.  The 
first of these, an editorial written by the editorial board of Life in May 1945 spoke specifically 
about the role of the court system in reconstruction and denazification in US-occupied Germany.  
The editorial board spoke about the meaning of “justice” in a conquered territory and questioned 
the impartiality of US courts in sentencing Nazis.  They claimed the US National Guild of 
Lawyers was prepared to “prove any German guilty of anything,” including charging directors of 
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IG Farben with crimes as serious as those of SS men (a conclusion the board clearly found 
reprehensible).152  Ultimately they decided “it is far, far better that some guilty men escape than 
that the idea of law be endangered. In the long run the idea of law is our best defense against 
Nazism in all its forms.”153  The board consistently stressed that the top-ranking officials who 
were making the actual decisions ought to be punished but the rest of the population was not 
responsible for the crimes committed during the war and thus should be spared by the courts.  
Oddly, industry executives were not included among the list of people responsible who should be 
punished.  By continuing to use “Nazis” when speaking about criminals and “Germans” when 
referring to the general population, their distinction between the two groups was quite clear. 
Another article speaking to the denazification policy in place in West Germany also 
criticized its lack of delineation between those at the top and the rest of the populace.  Though 
there were five categories for Germans to be placed under within the criminal system (the fifth 
category being innocent), the author still found the separation between each tier too subjective 
and the implementation of categorizing to be inconsistent depending on the city.154  According to 
Lochner, the occupying government had failed to understand the nature of fascist society and 
their arrest of any Nazi Party member was a waste of time.  Because anyone in a totalitarian state 
is forced be a member of the (single) party, he claimed the classification system would be 
unfairly targeting victims of the Nazi regime: the German populace.155  Lochner’s delineation 
between Germans and Nazis focused less on the value systems but rather the overreaching nature 
of fascist governments: because all citizens were essentially required to support the party, there 
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was no way of showing they were truly supportive of the regime and its crimes unless they were 
active participants in the planning of genocide (Lochner believed such men should be sentenced). 
The final article I encountered that made this distinction between Germans and Nazis was 
a piece of prose depicting the state of Berlin in 1950.  In his piece, Joseph Wechsberg pointed to 
the reaction of German audiences to a film as proof that Germans had put Nazism behind them 
and were potentially never truly supportive of the regime.  This film, Wonderful Times, used 
fifty-years-worth of newsreel footage about or in Germany (including the Kaiser, Greta Garbo, 
Hitler, Charlie Chaplin, Josephine Baker, and Mussolini among others), accompanied by a 
running commentary that was “one of ridicule and sarcasm, not nostalgia.”156  This film, popular 
among Berlin audiences, had Germans laughing at themselves: an action often stereotyped to be 
impossible for Germans.  He writes, “the Berliners are not sorry for themselves. On the contrary, 
they like to laugh at their own shortcomings, which, they admit, are not few.”157  Wechsberg 
points to the differences between the German people and the serious manner of Nazis to 
distinguish between the two.  The fact that Germans enjoy laughing at the failures of German 
militarism (both with the Kaiser and Hitler) shows how un-Nazi-like the population must be. 
This distinguishing narrative relied on finding alternative explanations for the rise of 
Nazism that would remove German agency (and therefore responsibility) from the story.  The 
careful use of “Nazi” when speaking about crimes and “German” when discussing the future of 
the country built upon traditional values was crucial to its efficacy.  Emphasizing the fascist, 
totalitarian nature of the regime made room for a narrative that painted regular Germans as 
victims of Nazism rather than willing, if not enthusiastic, participants.  The stories used to 
support this narrative were engaging, appealing to the love of liberty and freedom in US culture 
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and painting Germans in US-occupied cities as eager for the spread of democracy but who have 
struggled through a fascist regime before reaching that promised land.  The first and second 
popular narratives of Germany have now been discussed, but a third existed at this time as well 
that fell somewhere between these two. 
 
Saving the Nazi with Democracy 
 The third and final category is the most difficult to pinpoint the nature of because it is 
used in different ways depending on the source and time period.  In the end, however, all uses of 
this narrative did the same thing: a partial delineation was drawn between Nazis and Germans 
which suggested that Nazis can be saved under the right circumstances.  These “right 
circumstances” generally meant exposure to democracy and empathy: two things sorely lacking 
in the Third Reich.  However, the nature of this exposure varied: in some cases it was an after-
the-fact treatment that would make Germans change their mind about Nazism while in other 
cases it was a preventative measure that would save the German from ever falling into the 
clutches of Nazism. 
 The first film that exemplified this cure narrative was William Cameron Menzies’ 1944 
film Address Unknown.158  In this melodrama, two childhood friends Max Eisenstein and Martin 
Schulz own and run an art gallery in San Francisco.  The two immigrated to the United States 
from Germany with their wives decades prior, but Martin is now set to return to Germany to live 
there for several years.  Martin’s son Heinrich and Max’s daughter Griselle are madly in love 
and intend to get married after Griselle’s acting career takes off.  In order to do this, however, 
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Griselle decides she must accompany her “Uncle Martin” to Germany and work in the theaters in 
Austria while Heinrich stays with his “Uncle Max” in San Francisco to help run the art gallery.   
While living in Germany, Martin befriends a Nazi official and decides to join the party, 
quickly rising through its ranks.  Martin writes a letter to Max back home telling him they will 
no longer remain friends because Max is Jewish, saying, “It is impossible for me to be in 
correspondence with a person of your race, even if it were not that I have an official position to 
maintain.”  Heinrich, Martin’s son, reads this with Max and is disgusted with his father’s new 
politics.  Meanwhile, Griselle gets in trouble with the Nazi authorities for refusing to censor lines 
from her play and is forced to flee the theater, seeking refuge with Martin.  Martin, seeing the 
Nazis closing in on her and wanting to avoid trouble for himself, shuts the door in her face and 
listens as she is shot dead by the Gestapo. 
After notifying Max and Heinrich of Griselle’s death, Martin tells Max he cannot receive 
any more letters from him because the government would not approve of his constant 
correspondence with an American Jew.  Despite his request, Martin continues to receive coded 
messages from San Francisco that brings him at odds with the Nazi authorities.  Convinced Max 
has betrayed him and that the Gestapo believe he is a traitor, Martin contemplates suicide but 
eventually chooses to flee his home and escape punishment.  As he leaves his estate he is caught 
by the Nazis and presumably captured.  The film ends with Max in San Francisco receiving a 
letter that failed to be delivered to Martin and him turning to Heinrich, confused, wondering why 
a letter was sent to Martin because he had not written to him since Martin had asked Max stop.  
Heinrich then reveals it was he who continued to write the letters to his father, knowing it would 
put Martin in fatal danger with the authorities. 
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Address Unknown is a fascinating take on the connection between supporting Nazism and 
German heritage as it shows members of the same “Aryan” family caught on opposite sides of 
the fight due to their different environments.  Martin, a German Aryan begins to support the 
Nazis after returning to Germany, whereas his son, Heinrich, another German Aryan does not 
feel the same calling because he has stayed in the United States, surrounded by liberty and 
justice.  Nazism is therefore not an ideology that spreads by blood as Henry Taylor claimed in 
his opinion piece for Life, but instead a cultural phenomenon that can be cured.159  Loyalty is a 
theme again as it was in Underground, but this time it is loyalty to justice and the protection of 
democracy rather than loyalty to friends and family that saves Heinrich from falling to the Nazi 
allure.  As an Aryan he “should” be enticed as his father is, but his foundation of democracy and 
justice protect him from being seduced.  Martin, on the other hand, puts himself and the Party 
before all else, allowing Griselle to be killed and isolating himself from a lifelong friend. 
Address Unknown received a very positive review from the New York Times, with the 
paper saying the film was “not just another anti-Nazi film” but instead this film is “rewarding 
dramatically” and the changes from the book to the film had made it an even more thrilling story 
to see.160  Though access to the film’s box office records is limited, like Underground, it seems 
Address Unknown did not suffer the same controversy as Confessions of a Nazi Spy did upon its 
release.  This is likely due to the fact that the US had by now joined the war and were actively 
fighting the Nazis, and thus a negative portrayal of them in film was hardly uncommon.  With 
generally positive reviews from critics and little in the way of controversy, Address Unknown 
was widely viewed within the US and brought the question of the German’s ability to act morally 
further into the mainstream.  The film therefore lay the groundwork in 1944 for a narrative that 
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would be useful after the war in rebuilding Germany: though Nazis were evil people who must 
be stopped and cannot be reasoned with, the rest of the population could be saved with 
democracy and a focus on the true German values of family and loyalty. 
A second film that used this partial distinction was The Three Stooges’ 1940 slapstick 
comedy You Nazty Spy!161  Instead of revolving around the family, You Nazty Spy! follows 
dictator Hailstone and his two cronies as they seize control of Moronika from King Herman the 
6th and 7/8ths.  Under King Herman, Moronika was at peace, but the arms manufacturers in 
Moronika were eager to increase profit so they installed Hailstone and his henchmen in power to 
start an unnecessary war.  The crowds unquestioningly follow Hailstone, Field Marshal 
Gallstone, and Minister of Propaganda Pebble until the King stages a coup and an angry mob 
drive Hailstone and his men out of the palace and into a lion den where they are eaten. 
Obviously the world of Moronika is analogous to Germany, where Hailstone is Hitler, 
Gallstone is Göring, Pebble is Goebbels, and King Herman is the Weimar-era democracy.  With 
talking points like “Moronika for Morons!” (a play on Hitler’s slogan Deutschland den 
Deutschen), Hailstone plays the role of the inept but dangerous dictator capable of controlling 
masses with the help of Gallstone’s fist and Pebble’s tongue.  Despite falling susceptible to 
Hailstone’s tricks initially, the people of Moronika are able to overthrow the dictatorship and 
demand the return of the peaceful king.  The film therefore portrays Germans as susceptible to 
the lies and tricks of Nazism and complicit in the rise of the dictatorship (since it was 
Moronik/German industrialists who put Hailstone/Hitler in power), but still capable of saving the 
country if they realize the wrongs of the regime and push back enough.  They portray 
                                                        
161 Jules White, You Nazty Spy! (Columbia Pictures, 1940). 
Chapter 4 | Speyer Besancon 
84 
Hailstone/Hitler as not as strong and intelligent as Pebbles/Goebbels portrays him and, in the 
right scenario, easy to take down. 
You Nazty Spy! was one of two Three Stooges films made that mocked fascism in 
Europe.  This film was also the first of its kind to outwardly mock Hitler on the big screen 
through obvious parody and impersonation (Charlie Chaplin’s famous The Great Dictator was 
released nine months later).162  Despite its outward mockery of Hitler prior to the US joining the 
war effort, You Nazty Spy! escaped the attention and criticism of isolationists, perhaps due to its 
short nature (instead of a feature-length film, this piece was only roughly twenty minutes).  
Though the trio released other political shorts including another anti-Nazi short titled I’ll Never 
Heil Again, You Nazty Spy! was universally acknowledged as their best work in World War II 
propaganda.163 
Beyond these two films, a large number of magazine articles of the era also outlined the 
rehabilitative opportunity for Nazis.  These articles, all written after the war ended, outlined how 
Germany had changed since the Nazi regime was in power while still acknowledging the role the 
population played in allowing the regime to be rise in the first place.  The oldest of these four, an 
opinion piece by Reinhold Niebuhr, outlined the craving Germans had for democracy.  Citing 
their rejection of the Soviet-sanctioned SED (Socialist Unity Party of Germany) in Berlin and 
requests from the populace for a commitment from the United States to ensure German 
democracy, Niebuhr concluded that Germans had learned their lesson in the last regime and were 
eager to turn over a new leaf.164  Niebuhr called for the US to adopt a more economically 
pragmatic strategy for Germany, saying, “The American identification of democracy with free 
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enterprise is a luxury which Europe cannot afford. There is no possibility of saving freedom in 
Europe except by the support of political forces which stand to the left of American liberal 
thought.”165  The fall of Nazism left Germany in shambles and, though terrible crimes were 
committed in this country against both its own people and populations outside its borders, 
Niebuhr saw the Soviet threat of expansionist Communism as far more pressing in Germany.  In 
his eyes, the US needed to shift its German policy not just because of the Soviet threat but also 
because Germans were asking for American ideological and economic aid.  He concluded, 
saying “It is better to face the facts and to avoid the mistakes made in confronting the last 
tyranny.”166  To Niebuhr, the German had learned his lesson since the war ended, so the United 
States ought to have too. 
In December of 1947, the Life editorial board wrote another piece in defense of Germany, 
this time calling for new occupation policies that reflected the nature of the new German-
American relationship.  Consistently referring to Germany as a former enemy of the US, they 
make it clear that the days of German Nazism were far behind them and the country had adopted 
a new direction.  The board goes so far as to call Germany’s new status as an occupied nation 
both the “spearhead of Communism” (in the East) and the “outpost of democracy” (in the 
West).167  While also justifying their policy suggestions with economic pragmatism that would 
save the American taxpayer money, a significant portion of their justification rests in trusting 
Germany to be able to handle the responsibility of democracy again. 
The last article that best represented the optimism of saving the Nazi through democracy 
and law was Kay Boyle’s 1950 piece for The New Yorker that chronicled the trial of Heinrich 
                                                        
165 Ibid, 70. 
166 Ibid, 72. 
167 Editorial Board, “A New Policy for Germany,” LIFE Magazine, December 15, 1947. 
Chapter 4 | Speyer Besancon 
86 
Baab.  Heinrich Baab, known as “The Terror of the Frankfurt Jews” was an SS trooper accused 
of participating in 56 murders in Frankfurt from 1938 to 1943.168  His trial, finally seeing a 
courtroom in 1950 due to extensive administrative red tape, was handled completely by 
Germans: a German judge, a German jury, and German laws.169  Boyle wrote: “It was as if the 
will of the German people were finally putting on trial in a German courtroom… the 
ambiguousness of German duality.”170  Baab represented the Nazi past: his crimes were 
committed while acting in official capacity as a government official and with the legitimacy of 
the people.  His crimes were well documented and known to the public, as proved by the 
witnesses who came in to testify against him, and yet it was not until after the Nazis lost the war 
that his actions were considered criminal.  The outcome of the trial would be an indicator of 
German remorse.  After five weeks of trial with 157 witnesses and five days of deliberations 
within the jury, it was announced Baab was found guilty of 55 counts of murder, 21 counts of 
attempted murder, 30 counts of assault and battery (mixed with six counts of employing 
coercion), five separate counts of employing coercion, and lastly, 22 counts of deprivation of 
liberty.171  Sentenced to hard labor for the rest of his life, Baab was taken away and imprisoned.  
Boyle’s account of the Baab trial was a harrowing discussion of Nazi crimes that culminated in 
the atonement of the German people: the German court system had successfully put a Nazi 
behind bars without the help of occupying forces. 
This third category of narrative both condemned the complicity of the German population 
in the crimes of the Nazi regime while also offering an opportunity for the population to redeem 
itself.  Unlike the previous two narratives which were absolute in their condemnation of Nazis 
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(and Germans in the case of the first category), this depiction of the Nazi/German allowed room 
for hope of recovery and reconciliation.  While it seemed to grow in popularity after the war 
ended and discussion of reconstruction policy took center stage in relation to Germany, the roots 
clearly existed before the war ended in the two films discussed, from 1944 and 1940, 
respectively.  As the Soviet specter loomed large after the war, unforgiving denazification 
policies fell in popularity and criticism grew.  This narrative of redemption was used as a means 
of legitimating these criticisms, as will be explored in the next chapter. 
 
CONCLUSION 
There was no single depiction of “the German” in popular media throughout the 1940s.  
While some authors and directors told stories of evil Germans, determined to wipe democracy 
and liberty off the face of the planet, others told stories of evil Nazis targeting German civilians, 
bullying them into submission.  While essentially all stories included in popular media in the 
United States could agree on the wickedness and cruelty of the Nazi regime, some outlined a 
light at the end of the tunnel that held promise for the future of Germany. 
All three narratives were widely used throughout the entire decade, never allowing a 
single one to assert total dominance over the other narratives.  As explained in Chapter 2, foreign 
policy requires a concordant narrative in order to garner legitimacy.  Having a wide range of 
potential narratives to choose from allows for a wide range of policies to be put forward that can 
be legitimated if tied to a corresponding narrative.  In unsettled narrative landscapes like that of 
the 1940s, it is possible for a range of reconstruction and denazification policies to be pursued in 
Germany.  The reconstruction and denazification process in Germany involved a number of 
policies that seemed to contradict one another in the precedent they set: some punishing all 
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Germans for the war, while others punished only middle-ranking Nazi officials.  By utilizing the 
uncertainty surrounding the identity of Germany throughout the postwar era, these contradictory 




Chapter 5: Legitimating Nazis 
 In Chapter 2, I explained how narratives are crucial to the analysis of policies due to the 
role narratives play in legitimation.  In Chapter 3, I described the range of reconstruction policies 
implemented in West Germany after the war under American occupation authority.  In Chapter 
4, I showed the narratives of “the German” at play during the postwar moment and how varied 
they were.  In this chapter, I consider how these narratives relate to one another in terms of the 
policies that were enacted in West Germany.  How were the narratives actually used to legitimate 
policy?  What do these narratives show about the legitimation process and limitations of 
“legitimate” reconstruction policies that US officials could pursue? 
 
USING THE INDISCRIMINATE NARRATIVE OF GERMANS 
The first narrative I explained in Chapter 4 was that which made no distinction between 
Germans and Nazis, equating the two and implying that the entire country was universally guilty 
for atrocities committed during the war.  This narrative was used extensively by occupying 
authorities, particularly for legitimating punitive measures that would create a harsh occupation 
for the German people.  Harsh reconstruction and occupation policies would be easily justified to 
the American public if all Germans were portrayed as wholly evil individuals keen on rebuilding 
the Third Reich and resuming their quest for racial domination.  In what specific instances was 
this narrative invoked, however? 
 
American Occupation 
 Firstly, the United States’ occupation of Germany needed to be framed in a legitimate 
light to the people of the United States.  In the first document outlining American objectives for 
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Germany, JCS 1067, the occupying government explained their immediate plans for Germany.  
JCS 1067, drafted in part under the leadership of Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau, created 
a harsh peace for US-occupied Germany.  This directive justified the occupation of Germany as a 
spoil of war, claiming the US occupied Germany not to liberate “but as a defeated enemy nation” 
and their primary aim in Germany was to realize “certain important Allied objectives.”172  The 
US was to take no steps in rehabilitating the German economy or bettering living conditions in 
Germany.173  Specifically, the occupying authorities were barred from making conditions in 
Germany better than conditions in neighboring countries.174 
 In a telegram from Political Adviser for Germany Robert Murphy, he explained how 
much the German people hated Americans and still posed a great threat to American interests.  
“Large segments of the population have not had a change of heart. These people continue to hate 
all democratic institutions and believe that [the] Military Government was established to reduce 
all Germans to abject poverty to further our own selfish aims… They have become more bitter as 
denazification progresses and are frantically searching for some loophole through which to 
escape their compromised past. A resurgence of German national feeling is also notable… with a 
desire to compare Nazi regimentation and efficiency with the present unsettled state of affairs 
during the transition.”175  In this passage from a telegram he sent to Secretary of State James F. 
Byrnes, Murphy made no distinction between the beliefs of the Nazis now incarcerated and the 
rest of the German population: they all hated the Americans and democracy, and all longed for a 
return to the efficiency of the Third Reich despite the atrocities that government committed.  By 
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building upon the preexisting narrative of Germany as a fascist stronghold with a population of 
fanatical supporters, the legitimation process of harsh occupation conditions easily followed: 
Germans were evil individuals incapable of being left to their own devices due to their engrained 
hatred of democracy. 
 The portrayal of Germans as inherently anti-Semitic, fanatical fascists was not a narrative 
limited to 1945 either.  In 1949 (the year the denazification process was tasked to German 
officials with limited oversight of Allied officials), HiCOG John McCloy warned the US 
occupation personnel below him in Germany of the “renewal of Nazism and anti-Semitism” in 
their zone and the hardening attitude towards occupation within the general population.176  He 
insinuated that perhaps Germany was not as democratized as many hoped, due to its tendency 
towards extremes both Left and Right.  McCloy claimed that perhaps the best way to better the 
political situation in Germany was with “firmness and determination to act whenever 
necessary.”177  Despite the call for democratization by McCloy and other officials during this 
time, the continued occupation of Germany and oversight of the new democracy was justified by 
emphasizing the fascist tendencies of the populace. 
 Lastly, the justification of the differences in occupation for Germany and Austria had to 
be addressed by officials.  For background, Austria joined the Third Reich in 1938 in the 
Anschluss, or “connection/joining” in English.  The Anschluss is often described as an hostile 
annexation of Austria by the Nazis, however more critical historical analyses of the Anschluss 
have shown that Austria welcomed its union with Germany.178  After the war ended, however, 
Austria was treated as a victim of Nazi aggression rather than a complicit member of the Third 
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Reich.  Occupying authorities therefore had to justify the large differences between occupation 
of Germany and Austria.  In a speech by Secretary Byrnes at Stuttgart in 1946, he mentioned the 
state of Austria, saying, “Austria has already been recognized as a free and independent country. 
Her temporary forced union with Germany was not a happy event for either country and the 
United States is convinced that it is in the interest of both countries and the peace of Europe that 
they should pursue their separate ways.”179  By framing the Anschluss as an aggressive move 
made by Germany rather than a welcome union on behalf of the Austrians, a harsher occupation 
policy for Germany could exist while Austria’s occupation lasted only one year. 
 
Disarmament and Demilitarization 
 To justify the significant disarmament initiatives begun under US occupation authority, 
Germany had to appear as a clear and present threat to American interests in Europe.  Germany 
would have to be considered too irresponsible to maintain a military not under the direct control 
of Allied forces.  In JCS 1067 drafted by Morgenthau, the US was to stop Germany from ever 
becoming a threat to Europe again by eliminating “Nazism and militarism in all their forms,” 
apprehending war criminals, disarming and demilitarizing the country, and completely 
controlling Germany’s capacity to make war.180  Even when JCS 1067 was replaced for being 
too harsh in 1947 by JCS 1779, this new directive still called for disarmament, claiming the only 
way to achieve lasting peace in Europe was to impose restraints on Germany that would ensure 
Germany unable to revive its “destructive militarism.”181  No relaxation of disarmament and 
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demilitarization policy was to be introduced even years after hostilities had stopped and the US 
had begun to introduce democratization measures.  In a State Department policy paper released 
in 1948, officials again cited the possibility of German aggression in justifying the continued 
limitations on a German military.182  Because the USSR was no longer demilitarizing East 
Germany in the way the US had hoped it would, alternative means needed to be found “to 
provide security against any possible revival of German aggression.”183  Legitimation of 
demilitarization policy relied on the portrayal of Germany as a militarist nation eager to 
overthrow its occupiers through a military uprising. 
 
Reeducation Policy 
 The reeducation process also required a justification as well, one that would show how 
crucial it was for Germans to understand the error of their ways.  The indiscriminate narrative 
that equated Germans and Nazis would, when speaking about reeducation, specifically imply that 
Germans needed to understand their own responsibility in the crimes committed, not just the 
scale of the crimes committed by Nazis.  JCS 1067 included an objective based in reeducation 
that entailed teaching Germans that their own “ruthless warfare and the fanatical Nazi resistance 
[to occupation authorities] have destroyed the German economy and made chaos and suffering 
inevitable and that the Germans cannot escape responsibility for what they have brought upon 
themselves.”184  Reeducating Germany using this narrative revolved around teaching guilt to the 
entire populace and forcing regret into the minds of Germans everywhere.  Fortunately for 
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occupying authorities, this was precisely what they sought to do in Germany in order to better 
achieve compliance among the population. 
 
War Crimes Trial Process 
 Justification of the trials of Nazis did not require much convincing in principle, but a 
system of legitimating the different rounds of trials (Nuremberg versus Subsequent) was 
necessary in order to distinguish between the two while still framing the two as legitimate and 
just trials of Germany.  In a memorandum by Green Hackworth, a legal adviser to the Secretary 
of State, he outlined the difficulties in charging the entire nation for crimes committed.  While 
Hackworth assumed the general population was uniformly guilty of war crimes, he recognized 
that a strategy was needed to put men behind bars while there were very few witnesses to testify 
against them.185  According to Hackworth, atrocities committed before the war began were 
technically not in violation of international laws of war because they were committed during 
peacetime.  However, he emphasized the need to prosecute these crimes anyway due to the evil 
nature of such atrocities.  For this reason, he suggested splitting the trial system into two tiers.  
The first round, known now as the Nuremberg Trials, would target the obviously guilty criminals 
high up in the chain of command for whom there was significant incriminating evidence.  Once 
these men were sentenced, the subsequent trials could begin which would target the members of 
the organizations the leaders of Nuremberg had overseen and make it so membership alone 
would be enough to incriminate and yield a sentence of hard labor for a number of years.  If 
additional proof of participation in specific atrocities presented itself, the member could be 
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punished further, perhaps with a death sentence depending on the severity of participation.186  
Hackworth’s telegram shows the urge to convict en masse while retaining a semblance of 
legitimacy in the trial process. 
 In a memorandum by Under Secretary of State James Webb187 to President Truman, 
Webb outlined the five ways a person can be charged in relation to genocide using the 
internationally agreed upon laws regarding genocide determined by the United Nations.  Article 
III of the Genocide Convention bans genocide in five forms: the crime of genocide itself, the 
conspiracy to commit genocide, the direct and public incitement to commit genocide, the attempt 
to commit genocide, and complicity in genocide.188  Using these five charges of genocide in the 
trials of the Germans, many could be imprisoned.  Webb’s telegram also shows the push to 
convict the entire population of war crimes (either directly or indirectly through complicity) and 
force the country to atone in this way. 
 
Yes, “All Germans” 
There already existed similar narratives in the media that depicted Germans as heartless 
Nazis with a desire to kill any and all Americans they encountered, and this narrative was most 
useful when justifying harsh, punishing measures for Germany after the war.  As I explained in 
Chapter 3, however, not all policies enacted by the military government were punitive in nature.  
In fact, many were based on the principles of reconstruction and welcoming Germans and 
Germany into the fold of Western Europe.  Which narratives, then, were used to legitimate the 
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more positive policies enacted?  And what about policies that seemed to fall somewhere in 
between? 
 
USING THE DISTINGUISHING NARRATIVE OF GERMANS 
The second narrative I outlined in Chapter 4 of “the German” was that of a victim of Nazi 
aggression.  This German is inherently a peaceful individual, overpowered by the fascist, who is 
foreign to German traditions.  Though this narrative was less widely circulated by the end of the 
war and was less effective in the legitimation process (due to the fact that it essentially 
completely absolved every German of war responsibility and left very few people to blame for a 
war that had killed millions), it was still used on occasion to legitimate policy.  Specifically, this 
narrative was most useful in justifying policies that allowed more leniency and independence for 
the German people. 
 
Bringing Germans into Positions of Leadership 
 Firstly, the reintegration of Germans into positions of leadership after the initial purge 
could easily be justified using such a narrative.  In a telegram sent by Political Adviser Murphy 
to Secretary Byrnes, Murphy explained the difficulty occupation authorities had in identifying 
the differences between “Nazis and non-Nazis.”189  He suggested enlisting the help of non-Nazis 
in this task, as the locals had found fault in the denazification process because they found it to be 
simultaneously doing not enough and too much.  Local Germans, he reported, were unhappy that 
denazification had not adequately purged all Nazis from positions of leadership while also 
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unfairly removing those who were innocent from leadership.190  The distinguishing narrative was 
easily applied to legitimating the welcoming of Germans into positions of power again because 
in this narrative Germans were wronged by Nazis who had seized power in Hitler’s 
Machtergreifung (meaning “seizure of power” as opposed to Machtübernahme meaning 
“takeover of power,” another term used throughout the 1930s depending on who was speaking).  
If the Nazis were never legitimate leaders of Germany due to their failure to represent the true 
German, the general populace was safe to bring into positions of leadership. 
 
The New Party System 
 Another policy this narrative was used to legitimate was the new democratic system of 
parties.  In 1946, there was a push within the Soviet zone of Germany to combine the Social 
Democratic Party of Germany (SPD) and the Communist Party of Germany (KPD) into a 
Socialist Unity Party (SED).  In a telegram sent by Adviser Murphy, he explained that the 
merger should not happen in the East nor be forced upon party members in the Western zones 
because such a merger would not be the will of the people and would use undemocratic methods 
of coercion.191  He claimed the “present SPD opposition to [the] merger has been tremendously 
fanned by the undemocratic methods which are being used in this part of Germany to achieve the 
merger. Many SPD members have reacted strongly, pointing out that they didn’t go through the 
last years of Nazi domination to submit again to such methods.”192  Murphy drew a clear 
distinction between the members of true German democracy (Social Democrats) and the illegal 
usurpers that destroyed democracy in Germany (Nazis).  Murphy’s anti-Soviet stance on the 
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merger and the recommendation that the US does not follow suit in their zone was legitimated by 
depicting non-Nazi Germans as victims of Nazi fascism. 
 
The Victimized German 
Though the distinguishing narrative was not widely used in legitimation attempts of 
policy, it was still invoked on occasion.  Most policies that granted Germans some semblance of 
independence relied on the third narrative for the legitimation process.  This third narrative, 
explained further below, gave a more nuanced view of “the German” and therefore was more 
favorable for attempts at legitimation because it offered both a negative and positive portrayal of 
German actions during and after the war.  The distinguishing narrative, however, could only be 
effectively used to legitimate policies that imposed no guilt upon the general populace.  Because 
most reconstruction efforts acknowledged German war guilt in some manner, the first and third 
narratives were more popular for legitimation. 
 
USING THE DEMOCRATIZING NARRATIVE OF GERMANS 
The third and final narrative used to legitimate reconstruction policy was that which 
promised hope of redemption for the German people.  It acknowledged that regular German 
citizens were complicit in the crimes committed during the war for supporting these leaders, but 
it also suggested that such followers could be saved if taught democracy and empathy and if 
given a chance to prove themselves worthy of international respect and trust again.  This 
narrative was extremely effective for legitimating reconstruction policy because it acknowledged 
the wrongs of the German people while also leaving room to justify reconstructing the country.  
It was also flexible enough to serve as a mandate for American occupation in the first place 
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because it did not specify at what point Germans would have learned democracy to a satisfactory 
level and therefore could allow the US to remain in Germany as occupation authorities for as 
long or as short as the US desired. 
 
Democratization 
 To legitimate the extensive democratization efforts in the US zone of Germany, this 
narrative was extremely important.  Though JCS 1067 imposed harsh conditions of occupation in 
Germany and used the indiscriminate demonizing narrative (as explained above), it also used the 
democratization narrative to justify its simultaneous push towards the democratization of 
Germany.  JCS 1067 claimed that Germany suffered due to its own ties to Nazism and 
militarism, but that it was the United States’ duty to begin preparations “for an eventual 
reconstruction of German political life on a democratic basis.”193  The democratization of 
Germany was crucial to the reconstruction of Germany because without it, Germany would fall 
back to its fascist ways and with it, Germany would become a center of democracy in Europe. 
 In a telegram sent by Secretary Byrnes the same month JCS 1067 was implemented, 
Byrnes pointed out the difficulty in holding democratic elections while banning portions of the 
population from voting.  Byrnes directed occupation officials to continue to limit suffrage of 
active Nazis while allowing nominal Nazis to vote again in order to ensure the “greatest number 
of Germans possible” participating in democratic procedures.194  In a memorandum from 
Secretary of Mission Brewster Morris, Morris discussed the German support of the current ban 
on political parties.  He claimed that Germans were in support of the ban because they knew they 
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were not prepared to fully participate in a democracy after twelve years under Nazi control.195  
He also advocated for a push on behalf of the occupation authorities to relax the non-
fraternization and non-reconstructive policies put in place under JCS 1067 because he believed 
too much suffering and chaos in Germany would turn voters towards the extreme Right (Nazis) 
or Left (Communists).196  He did not find fault in the harsh conditions of occupation because 
they were too mean to the German population, but rather that it would be strategically beneficial 
to keep the Germans happy with the United States if they were to vote “correctly” in a 
democratic election. 
 Secretary Byrnes’ speech in Stuttgart did not solely use the indiscriminate narrative of 
Germany to legitimate US occupation policy: he also relied heavily on the democratization 
narrative.  His opinions of the future of Germany are best summated in this excerpt: “Freedom 
from militarism will give the German people the opportunity, if they will but seize it, to apply 
their great energies and abilities to the works of peace. It will give them the opportunity to show 
themselves worthy of the respect and friendship of peace-loving nations and, in time, to take an 
honorable place among members of the United Nations.”197  Byrnes put his faith in the ability of 
the German people to overcome their past once they substantially atoned for mistakes made and 
acknowledged their fascist traditions.  Once democracy took root in Germany, Byrnes believed it 
would be ready for a central government led by German representatives.198  Byrnes told his 
audience in Stuttgart that Germans deserved the chance to learn democracy and begin taking 
responsibility for their own country, over a year after hostilities ceased.199  Though Germany had 
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attempted to upend the modus vivendi in Europe three times in the past seventy years (the 
Franco-Prussian War, WWI, and WWII), he claimed it was capable of doing better and for this 
reason a push to democratize was justified. 
 In a telegram by Secretary Byrnes to the President, he addressed the manner in which the 
US would install democracy in Germany.  By guaranteeing civil rights, the rights of political 
parties, the rights of free trade unions, the freedom of press and radio, and the freedom of 
movement of persons and goods, democracy would effectively take root.200  He claimed the 
establishment of such rights was necessary in order to revitalize German economic and political 
life.  Again, the democratization of Germany was justified as a means to restore Germany as an 
economic power in Europe able to benefit the rest of the continent.  Similarly, Political Adviser 
Murphy referenced the benefits of German rehabilitation in terms of European recovery in a 
telegram he sent to Secretary Byrnes months later.201  Not only would a productive Germany 
ease the burden on the rest of the continent, a hearty democracy in West Germany could also 
undermine the Soviets in the East and lead to reunification, making Germany a political pawn in 
the Cold War between the United States and Soviet Union.202 
 HiCOG John McCloy released a policy directive in November 1949 intended to replace 
JCS 1779 which had been enacted in July 1947 to replace JCS 1067.  This new directive said the 
“German people should be enabled to develop their political independence along democratic 
lines in close association with the free peoples of Western Europe. They should be fully 
integrated into the common structure of a free Europe, to share in due time as equals in its 
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obligations, its economic benefits, and its security.”203  He claimed “the German people should 
be accorded the fullest possible freedom to shape their democratic future. The restraints imposed 
upon German freedom of action by the Occupation Statute are considered essential to the further 
realization of United States purposes in Germany. They represent a minimum of control without 
which the interests of the European community cannot be adequately safeguarded. They are not 
designed, however, to hamper the legitimate development of German political, economic and 
cultural life, nor to authorize the imposition of alien patterns of thought or behavior upon the 
Germans."204  McCloy justified the limitations on German democracy as a necessary element to 
the transition from an authoritarian government to a democratic one.  The redemption narrative 
was flexible enough to justify democratizing the country while also limiting suffrage and 
maintaining control of elections: two decidedly undemocratic things.  He vowed to “encourage 
the Germans to take an increasingly active part in the political and economic organization of free 
Europe” while also limiting the extent to which they would enjoy such an “active” role.205  
McCloy again invoked this narrative of redemption again one year later, claiming Germans were 
capable of installing a liberal democracy if given the opportunity.  He said Germans must do 
some of the democratization process themselves in order to win back the international trust after 
allowing “Hitler’s regime” (as he put it) to rise to power.206  By referring to the Third Reich as 
“Hitler’s regime,” McCloy distanced the rest of the population from the crimes committed in 
Hitler’s name while also acknowledging the responsibility the general populace had in 
supporting his rise to power. 
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Government Structure 
 The new structure of the German government was a task largely tied to the push towards 
democracy and therefore heavily relied upon the redemption narrative to legitimate such policies.  
As explained in Chapter 3, the occupation authorities had begun to set up a government 
beginning at the most local level with townships (Gemeinden) and gradually increasing the size 
of incorporation until eventually federal states (Länder) could be established and a central 
government could be installed.  JCS 1779 justified this push towards centralization by 
referencing the progress Germany had made under occupying leadership towards democracy and 
saying “the ultimate constitutional form of German political life should be left to the decision of 
the German people made freely in accordance with democratic processes.”207  A centralized 
German government would be acceptable to install once the country was satisfactorily 
democratized. 
 
Bringing Germans into Positions of Leadership 
 With a legitimate centralized government put in place, the occupying forces needed 
people to staff it.  The denazification purge had made millions of people disqualified from 
serving in public office, and thus the new policies that began to welcome Nazi Party members 
back into the democratic fold needed to be justified publicly.  JCS 1067 justified putting 
Germans in charge at the most local level (under strict oversight by occupation authorities) 
because this would allow “any breakdowns in those controls [to] rest with… German 
authorities.”208  This directive justified welcoming former Nazis back into public service by 
framing it as a strategic move: any issues the German public took with policies enacted by the 
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new government would be directed to the German locals rather than the US occupation 
authorities on top and introduce democratic accountability. 
 In his speech in Stuttgart, Byrnes also acknowledged the difficulty in claiming a hearty 
democracy while banning large swaths of people from public service.  He said “the Allies could 
not leave the leaders or minions of Nazism in key positions, ready to reassert their evil influence 
at first opportunity. They had to go. But it was never the intention of the American Government 
to deny to the German people the right to manage their own internal affairs as soon as they were 
able to do so in a democratic way, with genuine respect for human rights and fundamental 
freedoms.”209  Byrnes justified the initial denazification purge as a necessary step in 
democratization, while also leaving room to bring those banned back into public service due to 
the need to give Germans the opportunity to redeem themselves.  For this reason, the redemption 
narrative was invaluable in legitimating such reconstruction policies. 
 In a telegram sent by General Joseph McNarney to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, there was 
discussion of harnessing the power of German scientists by bringing them to work for the US 
military and space programs (many of whom ultimately did).  Occupying authorities had asked 
General McNarney if exceptions to the employment ban could be made for German scientists in 
order to use their expertise to beat the Soviets instead of allowing the scientists to defect to the 
Soviet zone.210  General McNarney decided that “those scientists and technicians who are 
determined to have attained unusual military significance in fields which may be detrimental to 
United States security, were their services to become available to other nations, be screened form 
the lists furnished by Washington and moved, together with their families, from Germany to the 
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United States or United Kingdom.”211  The Soviet threat of scientific superiority was used to 
legitimate the expatriation of German scientists into Western Allies’ nations.  McNarney implied 
that such scientists were too valuable to purge from government and important enterprises and 
could be trusted enough to work for the United States if they volunteered to do so.212 
 
Reeducation Policy 
 Byrnes also spoke at length about the importance of the reeducation policy in West 
Germany.  In a telegram sent to Political Adviser Murphy, Byrnes emphasized the need to 
remove Nazi and militarist literature from the public sphere, but warned against doing so in 
fascist-like ways reminiscent of Nazism.  Instead, Byrnes encouraged the use of positive 
programs of “democratic teaching and democratic example rather than attempting to 
suppress.”213  The reeducation policies introduced under occupation were legitimated with 
reference to the part they would play in bringing Germany toward a democratic path.  In his 
speech in Stuttgart, Byrnes said Germans must see that Hitler and his minions tortured and 
exterminated millions of people with German arms.214  The hardships in Germany were therefore 
“inflicted upon her by the war which her leaders started.”215  One of the most common themes of 
reeducation policies was the push to show the public that they were in this position due to their 
own actions; if Germany was to be mad about their living conditions, they should hunt down the 
Nazis that put them there rather than the Allied occupation authorities seeking to reconstruct the 
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country.  This frame of thinking was crucial to the occupation mandate and was drawn upon 
often for legitimation attempts. 
 
War Crimes Trial Process 
 The trial process was incredibly difficult for reconstruction because once convicted, it 
would be extraordinarily difficult to justify bringing a convicted war criminal to work for the 
government or accept government subsidies and contracts.  However, this did not stop OMGUS 
from strategically considering their plans for prosecution.  In a telegram sent by Political Adviser 
Murphy in 1945, he noted that the numbers potentially implicated in war crimes trials could 
exceed 100,000: a number far too large to handle and process.216  Murphy suggested that, 
pending the decisions in Nuremberg (which was currently happening at the time of the telegram), 
perhaps zone commanders could be allotted wide discretion in determining the extent to which 
prosecutions would take place under Article II of the Genocide Convention which banned 
genocide and its various forms.217  Murphy cited the administrative difficulty in prosecuting such 
a large number of individuals in his justification, however the reconstructive benefits for limiting 
such prosecution were also substantial. 
 
From Deindustrialization to Reindustrialization 
 I explained at length in Chapter 3 the inconsistencies in deindustrialization policies and 
how after not long many of the executives in charge of the largest industries returned to their 
positions of power after serving prison time.  This shift from deindustrialization policy to 
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reindustrialization was legitimated through constant reference to the need of an economically 
productive Germany.  In this infamous speech in Stuttgart, Secretary Byrnes claimed the Ruhr 
Valley (the resource-rich center of industry in Germany) was among the last “to succumb to 
Nazism” and, though “without the resources of the Ruhr Nazism could never have threatened the 
world,” the Ruhr “must now be used to rebuild a free, peaceful Germany and a free, peaceful 
Europe.”218  This defense of the Ruhr allowed Byrnes to justify a policy of economic 
rehabilitation under the leadership of executives convicted of war crimes due to their role in the 
Holocaust.  Byrnes legitimated the return of industrialists to positions of power by claiming the 
German economy could not recover without them and tying German rehabilitation to European 
rehabilitation. 
 
The Redeemable Nazi 
 The democratization/redemption narrative was crucial to legitimating most reconstruction 
policies because it offered the most control for the United States as an occupying power.  The 
indiscriminate narrative that equated Nazis and Germans made the country a lost cause: if all 
Germans were in fact wholly evil as that narrative suggested, there would be no purpose to 
reconstruction efforts because the best plan to minimize German war potential would be to 
completely demolish it.  The distinguishing narrative was not widely used for occupation or 
reconstruction either because it did not aid the US’ mandate of occupation: if Germans were in 
fact victims of fascism and know better, then the occupation of the United States would not be 
necessary.  The democratization narrative allowed the United States to determine for themselves 
what constituted “democratic enough” and what could be sacrificed for the sake of 
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reconstruction efforts.  For this reason, it was by far the most widely used narrative among 
policymakers of the time. 
 
CONCLUSION 
This chapter finally brought together the policies and narratives outlined in earlier 
chapters and spoke to the manner in which narratives were used to legitimate such policies of 
reconstruction in Germany.  The three major narratives I explored in this thesis could have been 
used to legitimate essentially any postwar policy for Germany: harsh programs like the 
Morgenthau Plan would rely on the first narrative, extensive reconstruction programs like the 
Marshall Plan could rely on the second narrative, and long-term occupation programs relied on 
the third narrative. 
One may note that in one document or speech, the author might switch back and forth 
between multiple narratives of Germany.  For instance, in the initial list of US objectives for 
Germany in JCS 1067, the second bullet point specifies that the US is not there for liberation but 
instead to occupy Germany as conquered territory and to realize American aims in Europe.  The 
third bullet point, however, outlines the plans to prepare Germany for a transition to a 
democracy.  This is a significant shift from “not here to liberate” to “we must democratize,” 
especially considering “liberation” by the United States seems to always entail democratization 
in some manner.  Secretary Byrnes’ speech in Stuttgart also switched back and forth throughout 
in which narrative of Germany it employed to legitimate policies suggested by the Secretary. 
There was a wide range of policies pursued by the Occupying Military Government after 
the war, and this was made possible by the multiple narratives available for use in the 
legitimation process.  The unsettled narrative landscape in the postwar United States allowed 
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policymakers to pursue a range of policies in Germany because these policies could be 
legitimated using the various narratives in play.  The ability to draw from multiple narratives was 
what also enabled the implementation of contradictory reconstruction policies in Germany: 
policymakers could shift from one narrative to another with ease while there was no single 
dominant narrative that they were limited to legitimate from. 
This chapter has shown why narratives are so important to understanding the 
implementation of policies.  Without an understanding of what narratives policymakers were 
using to justify the programs they sought to implement, justifications of these policies would 
appear even more hypocritical than they already do.  The identification of the underlying 
narratives at play during this time account for the ability of policymakers to switch between 
narratives in order to legitimate their desired policies.  Without the study of narratives, it would 
be extremely difficult to explain how these leaders were able to legitimately pursue such 




 My interest in German reconstruction initially began during my first year at Wellesley.  
In the Spring of 2016 I took Quinn Slobodian’s class, “Postwar Europe and the Three 
Germanies,” about East, West, and Reunified Germany, spanning from 1945 to the present.  The 
very first lecture in that class introduced me to the differences in reconstruction that occurred in 
East and West Germany, and included a discussion about the United States’ decision to keep the 
majority of German industry intact in order to harness this economic power for reconstructive 
purposes.  I remember being very flummoxed about the US’ decision to purge nominal Nazi 
members from government while allowing industrialists to remain in positions of power, and 
wondering how they could have possibly justified such decisions to the American public. 
 I then spent a year studying politics and history at the University of Oxford, taking 
tutorials in International Relations and twentieth century European history.  Among the many 
essays written that year was one about French myths of national resistance and victimhood in 
World War II, exploring the extent of collusion between the French government and the Third 
Reich.  I was fascinated by the success of France in rewriting its history of World War II, 
rebranding itself as solely a victim of Nazi aggression and ignoring the existence of Vichy 
France.  I remember having a conversation that year with a friend of mine who was hesitant to 
spend her tourist dollars in Germany, but did not have such qualms in visiting Austria, Italy, or 
France.  This made me continue to think about how legacies of war and narratives of war guilt 
live on decades past the actual conflict.  It made me wonder why we are more willing to forgive 
some countries over others, despite the common ties to fascism and genocide many of them 
have.  The process of reconstruction has always fascinated me, thinking about how a country is 
rebuilt and rebranded after an international war. 
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 I therefore initially began this thesis process looking to answer why contradictory policies 
were enacted under Allied supervision in West Germany.  Why were high ranking Nazis released 
from prison to return to their positions but the general population continued to suffer in poor and 
oppressive living conditions?  Along the way to write this thesis and after several discussions 
with Professor Goddard, I decided to change my question from the “why” to the “how:” How 
were US policymakers able to justify these contradictory policies?  Regardless of why officials 
in the US sought different punishments for Nazi Party members, no satisfactory explanation of 
how these contradictions were legitimated exists.  I believe this thesis offers an accurate 
explanation of the enabling mechanisms for American policymakers in the postwar United States 
and West Germany. 
 There are several major takeaways that I hope readers will garner from my work.  The 
first of these is, in my opinion, the most important: in discussions of the work Germany has done 
to address its fascist past, the role of the United States must be considered.  Whether a criticism 
or a commendation, the United States must be acknowledged as the primary actor in the early 
years of the republic.  Though the Federal Republic of Germany was founded in 1949 as a 
sovereign state, the United States remained involved in the internal and external workings of the 
state for long past 1949.  John McCloy’s position in Germany, High Commissioner, existed from 
1949 to 1955, to serve as the primary head of occupation and internal affairs on the ground.  It 
was after all McCloy, an American official, who released famed industrialist Krupp from prison 
in 1951.  When the international community therefore blames Germany for the Nazis that 
escaped prosecution, they must also condemn the United States who ran these trials and released 
early those convicted with prison time.  Too often I find that discussions of German 
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reconciliation are too small in scope, failing to account for external influences on the 
denazification and reconstruction process. 
 Another conclusion I hope readers will understand after reading this is the extent to 
which the United States failed to properly purge Nazis from government and the 
capitalist/democratic justifications they made for this decision.  Though US-Soviet relations 
worsened steadily in the years following World War II, the United States’ push towards 
democratization in Germany (justified as a necessary step in countering Soviet aggression) came 
at the cost of substantial denazification.  The United States was so threatened by a rival 
economic system (namely communism) that the leaders in charge of reconstruction in Germany 
chose to overlook the role high-ranking Nazi officials played in genocide and instead welcome 
these Nazis back into positions of power in order to harness their leadership capabilities.  There 
are many reasons the United States does not deserve the unconditional moral high ground it often 
claims in the name of democratization, but its failure to acknowledge the continuity between the 
Third Reich and the early years of the Federal Republic is one of them. 
 There were lasting consequences to incomplete denazification as well.  In 1966 when 
Kurt Kiesinger was elected to the Chancellery, it was revealed that Kiesinger was a Nazi Party 
member from 1933 through the end of the war.219  Beyond membership, Kiesinger served in the 
Foreign Office as well as the Propaganda Ministry; his work with the Nazi Party served as a 
rallying point within the student movement of the late 1960s in Germany.  The generational 
divide between students and their parents of the 1960s was a major destabilizing force in a 
decade of tension and turmoil: young people saw a failure to rid the German government of its 
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ties to fascism as they were blamed for the crimes committed by their parents during the war.220  
By not effectively ridding the government and industries of Nazis in the years directly after the 
war, the United States made Germany more susceptible to accusations of fascism and ultimately 
undermined its claims to democracy. 
 The fourth and final major takeaway I hope readers will gather from my work is the 
importance of narrative in analyzing foreign policy decisions.  Though the content of the policy 
presented is crucial to analysis, the context in which the policy is introduced is also essential.  
The content of the contradictory denazification policies alone did not offer a clue as to how these 
policies could coexist: it was in the context of the policies (the narratives used to legitimate 
them, specifically) that offered the necessary information for analyzing the decision making 
process.  Academics of rhetorical politics are already aware of the need to study legitimation 
techniques, and this thesis has shown why narratives are a crucial part of this field. 
 As this is an undergraduate thesis, limited to roughly nine months of research and 
writing, there is much more still to be said on this topic.  In January of 2019 I flew to Missouri 
with the intention of conducting archival research at the Truman Presidential Library and 
Archive in Independence, Missouri.  Much to my chagrin, after I arrived, I realized the federal 
government shutdown would affect my abilities to study at the library and archive: both were 
shutdown until further notice, awaiting orders from DC to end the shutdown.  I promptly flew 
back to Boston that night after a brief six hour stay in Missouri, and emailed Professor Goddard 
about a new plan of action.  Though I was able to conduct much of my research online through 
online databases and archives, there are still many documents not digitized to the Truman 
Library online archives and one doing further research on this subject would do well to visit the 
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library in Missouri when the federal government is not shutdown.  There were some 
reconstruction policies that I reference in Chapter 3 that I could not find referenced in relevant 
correspondence but I believe some of these documents may be in the boxes in Missouri. 
 World War II and the Cold War are the two most studied time periods in recent history, 
and for this reason it can be difficult to convince others that there is still more to be said and 
discovered about these times.  This thesis has shown that this is still a field of study rich with 
new material for analysis (especially as more documents become released to the public and 
digitized) and that old analyses of the decision making process during this time can develop 
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